GIFT  OF 
MICHAEL  REESE 


AN    OUTLINE 


INTRODUCTORY  TO 


KANT'S 
"CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON" 


BY 

R.   M.    WENLEY 

Proftstor  of  Philosophy  in  the  University  of  Michigan 


NEW    YORK 

HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 
1897 


U/4 


Copyright,  1897, 

BY 

HENRY  HOLT  &  CO. 


ROBERT  DRUMMOND,   ELHCTROTVPER  AND   PRINTER,   NEW  YORK. 


PREFACE. 

THIS  little  book  is  entirely  experimental.  In  the 
practical  work  of  teaching  I  have  found  that  stu- 
dents, when  about  to  undertake  first-hand  considera- 
tion of  a  classical  text,  are  apt  to  be  sensibly  handi- 
capped by  lack  of  a  general  conspectus  of  its  contents. 
It  seems  that  need  exists  for  a  pedagogical  aid  de- 
signed to  meet  this  want,  and  several  colleagues  have 
confirmed  me  in  this  idea.  The  main  difficulty  is  to 
supply  exactly  what  is  required  and,  at  the  same  time, 
to  refrain  from  giving  too  much.  For  it  is  unques- 
tionable, judging  from  past  experience,  that  some 
works,  similar  in  kind,  have  come  to  be  regarded  as 
"  short-cuts/'  Students  have  been  tempted  to  sub- 
stitute the  account  of  the  text  for  the  original  article. 
Accordingly,  the  aid  must  be  general,  and  also  no 
more  than  the  merest  introduction. 

In  these  circumstances,  my  object  is  easily  stated. 
I  desire  to  furnish,  in  the  simplest  possible  form,  an 
outline  of  the  contents  of  the  "  Critique  of  Pure 
Keason,"  and  to  show,  with  similar  generality,  how 
the  book  came  to  be  written  at  all.  My  intention  is 
that  this  sketch  should  be  mastered  by  pupils  im- 
mediately before  they  proceed  to  deal  with  the  text. 
It  is  designed  to  enable  them  to  see  where  their 
author  is  going.  My  hope  is  that  it  may  be  brief 

ill 


iv  PREFACE. 

enough  not  to  afford  even  passable  excuse  for  omit- 
ting careful  study  of  the  original,  and  sufficiently  in- 
teresting to  provoke  curiosity.  I  have  endeavored  to 
break  the  matter  down  as  much  as  possible;  and,  al- 
though Kant's  main  lines  are  naturally  pursued,  I 
have  not  scrupled  to  introduce  such  modifications  as 
appeared  to  me  to  render  the  argument  more  easy  of 
apprehension^  Pains  have  been  taken  to  eliminate 
technicalities,  and  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  con- 
fine the  use  of  philosophical  terms  as  far  as  may  be 
to  those  explained  in  the  course  of  the  outline. 

In  the  peculiar  case  of  the  "  Critique  of  Pure 
Eeason  "  this  outline  may  also  prove  useful  as  an  ex- 
ercise in  analytic  processes  for  students  who  are 
beginning  the  study  of  philosophy. 

Should  this  little  book  command  a  public — in 
other  words,  should  its  underlying  idea  be  approved 
by  my  colleagues  in  other  universities  and  colleges — 
it  is  the  publishers'  and  my  intention  to  include  in  a 
series  similar  accounts  of  the  leading  philosophical 
masterpieces.  To  this  end  we  hope  to  enlist  the  ser- 
vices of  prominent  teachers  in  America  and  Britain. 

I  have  to  thank  my  colleague,  Professor  Alfred 
H.  Lloyd,  for  reading  the  manuscript,  and  for  several 
valuable  suggestions  which  I  have  adopted.  At  his 
instance  I  have  added  the  brief  list  of  terms  given  at 

the  end. 

E.  M.  WENLEY. 
ANN  ARBOR,  MICH., 
July  19,  1897. 


CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

PREFACE .  ..  iii 

THE  GENESIS  OF  "  THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON  " —  1 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  "THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON ". .  21 
OUTLINE  OF    THE    CONTENTS  OF  THE    "  CRITIQUE  OF 

PURE  REASON  " 28 

THE  CONTENTS  OF  THE  "CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON" 

Introduction 32 

Transcendental  ^Esthetic 36 

Metaphysical  Exposition  of  Space  and  Time 39 

Transcendental  Exposition  of  Space  and  Time ...  40 

Transcendental  Analytic ....   42 

Discovery  of  the  Categories 43 

Deduction  of  the  Categories 45 

Schematism  of  the  Categories 52 

Transcendental  Dialectic 63 

Rational  Psychology 67 

Rational  Cosmology 71 

Rational  Theology 79 

CONCLUSION 85 

BOOKS 87 

TERMS 89 


KANT'S   "PURE   REASON." 

THE  GENESIS  OF  THE  «  CRITIQUE  OP  PURE 
REASON." 

THE  greatest  name  in  the  history  of  philosophy 
immediately  preceding  Kant  is  that  of  David 
I?ume  (fl.  1740-79).  His  office  was  to  sum  up  and 
settle  the  account  of  previous  thought.  In  various 
ways  the  thinkers  who  went  before  him  had  not  been 
altogether  faithful  to  the  assumptions  from  which 
they  started.  Hume  tried  to  correct  this  error  and, 
on  the  basis  of  certain  unexamined  principles,  to  es- 
timate the  value  of  human  experience.  The  ele- 
ments taken  for  granted  by  him  may  be  summarized 
as  follows.  (1)  The  method  of  inquiry.  This  is 
usually  known  as  individualistic  and  introspective. 
That  is  to  say,  an  examination  is  made,  not  of  knowl- 
edge in  general,  but  of  its  constitution  as  traceable 
in  this  man  or  that.  Reflection  turned  by  the  in- 
dividual mind  upon  itself  furnishes  the  principal 
source  of  information.  Each  one,  as  it  were,  stands 
by  himself  in  the  realm  of  knowledge,  and  is  re- 
sponsible for  his  own  requirements  and  contribu- 
tion to  the  common  stock.  This  is  plainly  illus- 
trated by  one  of  the  chief  difficulties  of  Hume's  con- 
structive theory.  He  supposes  that  the  complexity 

1 


\ 

2  THE  GENESIS  OF 

of  experience  is  to  be  accounted  for  by  the  opera- 
tions of  association  hardened  into  permanency  by 
habit;  but  this  process  begins  afresh  in  every  life, 
and,  within  the  narrow  span  of  the  individual's 
career,  it  must  originate  and  complete  the  syntheses 
necessary  to  knowledge.  Here  the  idea  of  heredity, 
one  offspring  of  the  doctrine  of  evolution,  has  no 
place;  and,  similarly,  the  conception  of  the  solidarity 
of  experience,  so  conspicuous  now,  holds  no  prom- 
inence. (2)  Like  his  predecessors,  Hume  accepted 
what  is  commonly  known  as  the  "  two-world  "  theory 
of  Descartes.  Thought  and  extension — mind  and 
matter,  as  we  should  now  say — are  two  separate 
spheres.  Not  only  this;  they  are  actually  opposed  to 
each  other.  Neither  possesses  any  quality  in  common 
with  the  other.  A  great  gulf  is  fixed,  and  the  main 
problem  of  philosophy  naturally  stands  closely  con- 
nected with  the  undoubted  bridging  of  the  chasm 
which  does  take  place  in  experience.  (3)  Given 
this  dualism,  the  question  necessarily  occurs,  How 
can  knowledge  get  into  mind  ?  It  must  either  origi- 
nate there,  according  to  the  doctrine  of  innate  ideas 
or  intuitionalism,  or  it  must  coine  in  through  the 
medium  of  the  senses.  As  concerns  Hume,  the  latter 
of  the  alternatives  exercised  paramount  influence. 
So  his  third  assumption  was  that  all  knowledge  is 
ultimately  referable  to  sensation.  No  idea  has  any 
value  unless  it  can  be  carried  back  in  an  analysis  to 
the  impression  from  which  it  took  origin.  All  notions 
that  are  too  complex  for  this  sensational  reference 
are  to  be  set  down  as  illusions,  which,  in  turn,  can 
be,  not  explained,  but  explained  away.  The  chief 


I 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.  3 

representative  of  this  mode  of  approaching  the 
problem  was  Locke.  (4)  But,  as  every  one  knows, 
there  is  an  old  proverb  that  runs,  "  Every  man  to 
his  taste."  And,  if  impressions  be  the  basis  of  knowl- 
edge, it  must  apply  in  thought  as  well  as  in  matters 
of  mere  taste.  In  other  words,  each  man  is  confined  - 
to  the  states  of  his  own  consciousness.  Berkeley 
adopted  this  position,  especially  in  his  early  thought, 
and  developed  it  in  an  intellectual  rather  than  a  sen- 
sational direction.  For  him  nothing  exists  save, 
"spirits  and  their  modes."  Thinking  beings  and 
the  ideas  that  emanate  from  them  constitute  the  sole 
realities.  Hume's  data,  then,  may  be  summarized  < 
in  the  three  terms,  Individualism,  Dualism,  Sensa-  \ 
tionalism.  His  predecessors,  however,  employed 
these  assumptions  mainly  as  starting-points,  and,  as 
necessity  pressed,  admitted,  for  the  most  part  uncon- 
sciously, the  presence  of  other  elements.  Descartes 
finds  that  Deity  is  a  tertium  quid  so  functioning  as 
to  render  matter  and  mind  factors  organic  to  a  single 
experience.  Locke  does  not  rest  satisfied  with  his 
sensationalism,  but  introduces  a  metaphysical  hier- 
archy of  primary  qualities  of  body  and  of  substance. 
Berkeley,  too,  finds  it  impossible  to  account  for  the 
unity  of  experience  by  reference  to  mere  modes  of 
thinking  beings,  and,  to  supplement  them,  uses  other 
thinking  beings,  whom  all  know  as  "  notions,"  in 
addition  to  the  original  ideas  or  modes  of  the 
individual  consciousness ;  while,  to  explain  the 
sameness  of  these  many  thinking  beings,  the  concep- 
t^'on  of  God  is  necessary.  Hume's  ideal  was  to  rid 
thought  of  these  inconsistencies;  given  the  presup^ 


4  THE  GENESIS  OP 

positions,   what   are   the   sole   logical   deductions  ? 
This  is  his  question. 

In  view  of  the  consequences  he  deduces  from  these 
presuppositions,  Hume  is  ordinarily  termed  a  skeptic. 
But  this  name  requires  to  be  interpreted  in  his  case. 
He  is  no  skeptic  for  the  sake  of  skepticism.  He  is 
not  irreligious,  or  rationalistic,  or  blasphemous;  the 
usual  associations  of  skepticism  hardly  apply  to 
him.  He  ought  rather  to  be  regarded  as  an  intel- 
lectual skeptic.  His  aim  is  to  put  himself  in  a  posi- 
tion to  "  unmake "  knowledge.  If  the  operative 
ideas  whereby  experience  is  elaborated  and  held  to- 
gether be  no  more  than  variations  of  original  sim- 
ple impressions,  then  one  can  reduce  them  to  their 
proper  level  by  application  of  the  method  of  analysis. 
This  enables  man  to  rid  himself  from  the  incubus 
of  those  illusions  wherein  all  his  more  complicated 
and  so-called  spiritual  life  finds  origin.  "  The  only 
method  of  freeing  learning  at  once  from  these  ab- 
struse questions  is  to  inquire  seriously  into  the 
nature  of  human  understanding,  and  to  show  from 
an  exact  analysis  of  its  powers  and  capacities  that 
it  is  by  no  means  fitted  for  such  abstruse  ques- 
tions." In  this  way  Hume  reduces  knowledge  to 
its  lowest  terms,  and  shows  that,  on  the  basis  of  the 
assumptions  made  by  his  predecessors,  no  other  con- 
clusion is  logically  tenable.  The  universe,  sub- 
jective knowledge,  and  objective  reality  disappear 
beneath  the  touch  of  his  hand.  The  constructive  con- 
ceptions of  God,  of  Self,  and  of  Cause  are  proved  to 
be,  not  simply  the  work  of  imagination,  but  of  the 
imagination  operating  upon  delusions  which  it  has 


I. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON. 


itself  previously  conjured  up.  Every  effect,  as  Hume 
says,  is  different  from  its  cause,  if  we  set  out  with 
isolated  impressions  as  data.  It  cannot  be  dis- 
covered in  the  cause.  There  is  nothing  in  any 
object  taken  by  itself  which  can  afford  us  a  reason 
for  drawing  a  conclusion  beyond  it.  Starting  with 
indifferent  "  side-by-sideness,"  or  indifferent  se- 
quence, if  such  a  phrase  be  permissible,  the  indif- 
ference must  remain  the  prominent  feature  till  the 
end.  Things  may  be  "  conjoined,"  they  can  never 
be  necessarily  "  connected."  Impressions  do  become 
conjoined  by  association,  and  habit  bolsters  this  con- 
junction up  till  it  assumes  a  certain  permanence  and 
furnishes  a  foundation  for  further  complexities.  But 
the  fact  that  impressions  are  the  all-in-all  remains 
and  cannot  be  surmounted.  This  criticism  is  cap- 
able of  application  in  every  corner  of  experience; 
nothing  is  too  complicated  or  too  sacred  to  escape 
it.  Personality,  religion,  science — all  disappear  into 
the  inane  before  it.  Given  the  presuppositions,  and 
the  result  inevitably  follows.  Consequently  it  avails 
nothing  to  attack  the  argument  in  the  course  of  its 
procedure.  The  starting-point  must  be  examined. 
Is  it  true  that  all  knowledge  comes  from  impres- 
sions ?  Do  the  conceptions  of  the  universe,  which 
this  question  implies,  stand  capable  of  defence  ?  In 
other  words,  are  they  actually  thinkable,  can  they 
be  for  an  experience  such  as  man's  ?  We  shall  see 
that  the  problem  came  to  strike  Kant  in  this  way. 
His  reply  to  Hume  is,  not  a  disproof  of  skepticism, 
but  a  fresh  analysis  of  the  elements  that  cannot  but 
enter  into  thought.  He  does  not  seek  to  rebuild 


6  THE  GENESIS  OF 

the  universe  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  it  secure 
against  the  skeptical  assault.  But,  admitted  that 
man  has  the  experience  which  he  possesses,,  Kant 
asks,  what  elements  must  necessarily  have  entered 
into  its  constitution  ?  To  understand  this,  we  must 
inquire  briefly,  and  in  general  outline,  into  Kant's 
own  life  and  environment. 

With  a  united  Germany  wielding  the  headship  of 
Europe,  with  an  educated  Germany  leading  the 
world  in  scholarship  and  science,  it  is  difficult  for 
one  to  realize  to-day  the  condition  of  Prussia  and 
the  other  states  of  the  new  empire  during  the  second 
and  third  quarters  of  last  century.  Napoleon's 
crushing  blow  at  Jena  had  internal  as  well  as  ex- 
ternal causes.  Culture  had  died  down;  the  endless 
subdivisions  into  petty  monarchies  and  dukedoms 
had  resulted  in  a  system  of  overtaxation  by  which 
the  people  were  confirmed  in  a  species  of  laborious 
barbarism.  What  light  and  leading  there  were  had 
to  be  imported  from  France;  the  continual  recur- 
rence, in  articles  and  the  like,  of  the  heading 
"Frederick  the  Great  and  Voltaire"  is  significant 
of  the  general  drift.  Semler,  Eeimarus,  Garve,  and 
Wolff — backed  by  the  all-pervading  influence  of 
French  skepticism  and,  to  some  extent,  of  English 
deism — were  the  popular  philosophers.  Wolff  pre- 
pared the  way  for  the  spirit  of  the  "  Encyclopedic  " 
as  the  imitations  of  Versailles  at  every  tiny  court 
made  Napoleon's  path  smooth. 

Wolff,  though  nominally  a  follower  of  Leibniz, 
had  endeavored  to  graft  on  the  monad  theory  the 
still  more  analytic  processes  of  medieval  logic.  His 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PUR. 

ideal  in  philosophy  was  a  series  of  formula)  whereby 
the  complexity  of  mind  and  matter  might  be  re- 
duced to  simplicity.  Soul,  for  example,  was  no 
longer  to  be  viewed  as  one  element  in  a  universe  of 
mutually  percipient  entities,  but  was  to  be  reduced 
..to  the  level  of  a  simple,  incorporeal  substance.  The 
dogmatism  wherein  Hume  could  see  nothing  but 
blank  skepticism  was  in  Wolff's  system  to  speak  its 
last  and  most  extreme  word.  Now  it  is  to  be  remem- 
bered, at  the  outset,  that  Kant's,  intellectual  life  was 
nourished  on  this  type  of  thought.  E"ay  more,  he 
was  indebted  for  almost  everything  to  its  represent- 
atives. At  Konigsberg  Wolffianism  stood  as  the 
official  teaching  of  the  university.  Schultz,  one  of  its 
exponents,  was  Kant's  earliest  academic  benefactor. 
But,  as  so  often  happens  with  brilliant  students,  the 
dominant  thought  was  destined  to  appeal  to  Kant 
in  an  even  more  influential  manner.  One  teacher, 
distinguished  above  the  others  by  his  force  and 
power,  moulded  the  growing  intellect  of  the  future 
philosopher  and  determined  the  course  of  his  thought 
for  many  years.  This  professor  was  Martin  Knut- 
zen,  a  man  apparently  of  unusual,  if  not  extraordi- 
nary, talent.  Although  only  twenty-seven  years  of 
age  when  Kant  entered  the  university,  he  had  al- 
ready been  a  professor  for  six  years.  He  was  a 
disciple  of  the  Wolffian  school,  and  added  to  his 
marked  ability  in  other  ways  an  exceptional  gift  of 
teaching.  Kant  was  therefore  brought  up  in  Wolffi- 
anism according  to  the  most  influential  and  the  most 
enduring  method.  It  came  to  him,  not  as  a  series  of 
dry  facts;  but  from  the  lips  of  a  great  teacher  whose 


8  THE  GENESIS  OF 

personality  went  out  into  the  dead  system,  bringing 
it  home  to  the  pupil  as  a  living  thing — living,  doubt- 
less, the  longer  time,  and  with  the  profounder 
strength  in  that  its  sway  was  centred  in  the  chival- 
rous devotion  engendered  by  close  personal  inter- 
course between  an  able  teacher  and  a  disciple  in 
whom  future  attainment  was  foreshadowed.  Wolf- 
fianism,  then,  must  have  been  a  sort  of  gospel  to 
Kant;  it  was  the  philosophical  faith  of  his  patron,  and 
of  his  revered  teacher  and  friend.  But,  as  we  shall 
see,  the  pressure  of  an  age  was  destined  to  outweigh 
even  the  deepest  sense  of  obligation  to  individuals. 

Wolff's  philosophy  had  several  cardinal  defects 
which,  though  patent  enough  to-day,  were  but  gradu- 
ally perceived  by  those  with  whom  the  eighteenth- 
century  spirit  exercised  influence. 

In  the  first  place,  like  the  French  encyclopaedists 
and  the  English  deists,  the  German  illuminati 
were  never  tired  of  dilating  upon  the  supremacy  of 
the  faculty  termed  Keason.  Everything  must  needs 
be  brought  to  the  bar  of  man's  Understanding — the 
discursive  faculty  known  as  didvoia  by  the  Greeks, 
Discursus  by  the  Eomans,  and  Verstand  by  the  Ger- 
mans. What  accords  with  Eeason  is  alone  true;  all 
else  is  false,  worthless  superstition.  But  the  final 
standpoint  of  Kant  is  already  implicitly  present  in 
this  contention.  If  it  be  true  that  Eeason  alone  is 
able  to  adjudicate  upon  things,  if  it  be  admitted 
that  all  the  contents  of  experience  must  be  evaluated 
according  to  certain  formulae  derived  from  Eeason, 
then  the  entire  contention  of  the  "  critical  stand- 
point "  has  been  admitted  beforehand.  The  unity  of 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.  9 

experience — the  fact  that  thought  is  one  the  world 
over,  that  specific  ideas  pervade  all  judgments  alike, 
that  the  universe  is  capable  of  being  rationalized— 
arises,  not  from  sense  or  from  external  things,  but 
from  some  activity  of  Eeason  whereby  it  unites  itself 
with  things,  so  constituting  a  binding  relationship 
that  is  the  basal  circumstance  in  the  possibility  of 
knowledge.  Yet  Wolff  strangled  this  assumption 
at  its  birth  as  it  were.  For,  following  the  spirit  of 
his  age,  he  supposed  that  this  universal  principle 
was  exhausted  in  applying  the  analytic  laws  of  formal 
logic.  But,  one  naturally  asks,  in  applying  logical 
law  to  what  ?  If  Eeason  have  no  other  office  than 
the  analytic  round  of  logical  processes,  whence 
come  th£^ijiaterial§  t-hat  are  to  be  analyzed  ?  Evi- 
dently, in  the  circumstances,  they  are  not  to  be 
sought  within  the  realm  of  Eeason  itself.  They 
must  come  from  some  other  and  external  sphere. 
Or,  to  put  it  otherwise,  if  Eeason  be  purely 
formal,  it  is  not  supreme,  nay,  its  manifestation 
is  secondary  to  those  "other  things"  that  afford 
the  corpus  vile  on  which  it  is  to  operate.  Your 
pathologist  must  have  his  subject  to  the  very  exist- 
ence of  his  science.  The  relativity  of  Eeason,  its 
secondary  character,  constitutes  the  first  major  de- 
fect of  the  Wolffian  view. 

Twelve  years  after  the  death  of  Knutzen,  but 
still  no  less  than  eighteen  years  before  the 
"Critique  of  Pure  Eeason,"  we  find  Kant  re- 
volting against  this  purely  formal  account  of 
Eeason.  At  this  time  he  instituted  a  distinction 
between  what  he  called  "  Pure  Thought "  on  the  one 


10  THE  GENESIS  OF 

hand  and  "Knowledge"  on  the  other.  " Pure 
Thought/'  according  to  his  doctrine  at  this  period, 
was  practically  the  exponent  of  the  Wolffian 
analysis.  Its  activity  was  in  no  sense  creative 
or  operative.  Its  task  was  to  break  up  the  con- 
tents of  thought  which  had  previously  been  sup- 
plied from  some  other  source — obviously,  of  course, 
sensation.  To  this  point,  then,  Kant  was  still 
at  one  with  his  past  masters.  But  "  Knowledge " 
was  a  second,  and  hitherto  unperceived,  content 
of  Eeason ;  and,  so  far  from  being  analytic, 
it  was  held  to  involve  synthesis,  and  this  in  the  very 
nature  of  the  case.  Now,  as  soon  as  analysis  is  for- 
saken and  synthesis  substituted,  the  way  is  opened  for 
a  new  and  entirely  different  conception  of  Keason. 
But  this  resultant  conception  depends  entirely  upon 
the  kind  or  nature  of  the  synthesis  contemplated.  If, 
on  the  one  side,  it  be  considered  a  necessary  ante- 
cedent of  knowledge, — if,  that  is,  mind  be  supposed 
to  go  through  some  process  of  its  own,  a  process  in- 
volved in  the  very  existence  of  knowledge, — then  we 
have  arrived  thus  early  at  the  general  conception 
that  informed  the  "  critical  standpoint "  proper. 
Needless  to  say,  this  was  hardly  the  kind  of  synthesis 
that  Kant  now  had  in  view.  On  the  contrary,  he 
rather  considered  that  the  synthesis  peculiar  to 
knowledge  was  of  the  nature  with  which  the  positive 
sciences  have  now  made  us  familiar.  In  other  words, 
he  was  thinking  more  of  an  induction  than  of  any 
other  process.  Here  mind  does  not  yet  stand  at  the 
centre  of  experience,  but  awaits  events  and,  with 
these  as  basis,  projects  itself  into  a  future  of  its  own 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          11 

creation.  So,  for  Kant  at  this  stage  Knowledge  still 
remains  chiefly  a  process  of  analysis,  because  the  syn- 
thesis which  it  is  alleged  to  involve  is  no  more  than  a 
progress  from  given  particulars  to  a  supposed  univer- 
sal beyond  them.  The  synthesis,  in  short,  is  a  result, 
\  not  a  condition.  Yet,  even  thus,  it  is  important  to 
note  that  at  a  time  long  prior  to  the  "  Critique " 
Kant  was  beginning  to  discover  for  himself  some- 
thing of  the  inadequacy  of  the  Wolffian  theory. 

The  second  weakness  of  Wolffianism,  and  Kant's 
attitude  towards  it,  bring  us  to  a  period  five  years 
subsequent  to  that  just  noticed — 1768.  As  has  been 
said,  Wolff  was  nominally  a  disciple  of  Leibniz. 
JSTow,  from  one  point  of  view,  the  monad  theory  of 
Leibniz  was  just  as  individualistic  as  the  impression 
theory  of  Locke.  The  dictum  that  "  every  monad 
really  excludes  the  whole  universe  "  inevitably  leads, 
on  this  side,  to  a  universe  in  which  everything  is 
only  conjoined.  Attraction  comes  to  be  accidental; 
essential  connection  there  is  none,  for  each  thing 
stands  for  itself,  is,  or  has  being,  out  of  relation  to 
any  other  object.  Kant's  next  step  is  taken  when  he 
comes  to  a  critical  attitude  in  regard  to  this  doctrine. 
He  contended  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  this  atomistic 
view  of  things  is  not  true;  they  do  stand  in  close  re- 
lations to  each  other.  Mind,  too,  has  something  to 
say  in  respect  of  this  connection.  As  in  the  former 
case,  Kant's  early  criticism  is  imperfect.  He  did  not 
yet  see  that,  things  must  stand  in  specific  relations  to 
one  another — that  even  non-being  cannot  be  known 
by  its  bare  self.  At  this  time  Kant  held  that  the 
relations  are  characteristic  of  the  objects,  because 


12  THE  GENESIS  OF 

they  are  welded  into  one  universe.  They  are  con- 
nected as  a  matter  of  fact,  because  they  have  been 
built  into  a  single  universe  by  God.  Eelations  are, 
accordingly,  not  qualities  that  inhere  in  things  from 
the  very  fact  of  their  existence,  but  they  flow  from 
the  ordering  laws  of  deity.  Even  this  external  idea 
was  better  than  the  irrelatedness  of  Wolff.  But, 
fortunately,  it  is  not  the  whole  account  of  the  situa- 
tion. Kant  took  one  other  step  which  was  to  have 
momentous  consequences.  He  not  only  departed 
from  the  atomistic  standpoint  of  his  teachers,  but  he 
came  to  see  that  there  are  some  relations  which  ex- 
ist owing  to  the  nature  of  the  case.  That  is,  things 
would  not  be  as  they  are  but  for  the  presence  and 
operation  of  those  relations  known  to  us  under  the 
name  of  Space.  Objects  cannot  be  thought  of  at  all 
unless  they  have  first  entered  into  specific  relations 
with  one  another  in  space.  This  connection  is  fun- 
damental, constitutive ;  apart  from  it  experience 
would  be  impossible.  The  synthesis  is  not  one  that 
may  or  may  not  occur  in  the  course  of  life;  it  is  itself 
a  presupposition  of  the  kind  of  knowledge  that  man 
possesses. 

The  third  defect  of  Wolffianism  from  which  Kant 
revolted  is,  like  the  second,  a  direct  result  of  the 
Leibnitian  element.  It  arises  in  discussion  of  the 
problem,  What  is  the  relation  between  the  universal 
and  the  individual  ?  On  this  point  Wolff  uncon- 
sciously contradicts  himself.  The  universal,  or 
God,  is  an  individual  monad  like  all  the  rest.  It  is 
rounded  off  in  itself  and  consequently  excludes 
every  other  existence.  Its  universality  comes  there- 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          13 

fore  to  be  a  matter  of  name  rather  than  of  fact.  It 
consists  in  its  greatness  or  bigness,  and  this  does  not 
contain  a  guarantee  of  true  universality.  A  double 
movement  of  thought  lurks  here.  Either  the  uni- 
versal is  no  more  than  a  greater  individual,  an  ox 
among  the  frogs,  or,  to  obtain  universality,  it  must 
swallow  everything  else.  The  universal  either  takes 
rank  with  individuals,  or  there  are  no  individuals. 
The  two  conceptions  are  thus  inherently  opposed  to 
one  another,  and  above  this  opposition  Wolffianism 
never  rises.  From  this  covert  contradiction  Kant  re- 

vvolted,  and,  in  so  doing,  came  very  near  to  the  "  criti- 
cal standpoint "  proper.  He  made  bold  to  declare 
that  there  is  no  such  opposition  as  is  here  contem- 
plated. In  his  view,  universal  and  individual  are 
alike  incident  to  an  original  synthesis  which,  in  turn, 
must  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  conditions  of  the 

V  possibility  of  knowledge.  When  this  idea  first 
dawned  upon  him,  Kant  was  no  doubt  inclined  to 
regard  the  prior  unity  in  a  pantheistic  way.  It 
seefried  to  him  as  if  some  species  of  living  principle 
— Weltseele — were  pervading  external  matter,  order- 
ing both  the  permanent  and  the  accidental,  yet  never 
manifesting  itself  after  any  definite  fashion.  Lat- 
terly, however,  when  he  came  to  the  "  critical  stand- 
point," he  perceived  that  this  relation  between 
universal  and  individual,  if  a  condition  of  experience, 
is  not  to  be  located  in  any  foreign  principle,  but 
must  be  a  property  of  mind  itself.  He  was  able  to  re- 
gard it,  in  short,  as  one  of  those  mental  principles 
which  the  oneness  of  "Reason  everywhere  at  once 


14  TEE  GENESIS  OF 

reveals  and  proves — proves  in  the  sense  that  it  is 
unable  to  explain  it  away. 

To  sum  up.  As  Kant  begins  to  realize  the  limita- 
tions of  the  system  on  which  he  had  been  brought 
up,  he  strives  to  break  away  from  them,  each  time 
making  an  advance  in  his  own  constructive  thought 
till,  at  length,  he  reaches  the  groundwork  of  the 
great  "  Critique/'  to  which  we  now  turn. 

At  the  risk  of  some  little  repetition  we  must  here 
ask  ourselves  the  question,  What  were  the  various 
influences  at  work  in  Kant's  mind  just  before  he 
arrived  at  the  "  critical  standpoint  "  ?  What,  other- 
wise, were  the  immediate  causes  that  led  him  to  this 
new,  and  epoch-making,  view  ?  To  begin  with,  note 
once  more  the  Wolffian  doctrine  that  the  activity  of 
thought  is  a  formal  analytic  process.  In  opposition 
to  this,  Kant  had  so  far  developed  another  explana- 
tion. As  we  have  seen,  he  had  learned  for  himself 
that,  given  analysis  pure  and  simple,  there  cannot 
be  any  satisfactory  explanation  of  experience.  He 
therefore  attempted  what  looks  suspiciously  like  a 
compromise,  —  the  distinction  between  "  Pure 
Thought"  and  "Knowledge."  Wolffianism  could 
still  claim  him  in  so  far  as  he  held  that  the  entire 
activity  of  "  Pure  Thought "  is  exhausted  in  the 
analytic  process  ruled  by  the  laws  of  Identity  and 
Non-contradiction.  But  he  had  departed  from  his 
early  faith  in  that  he.  had  asserted  for  "  Knowledge  " 
a  certain  power  of  synthesis.  This  faculty,  he  had 
argued,  could  not  be  were  it  not  for  a  principle  of 
connection  by  means  of  which  it  binds  together  iso- 
lated impressions.  Embedded  in  this  position  lay 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          15 

the  difficulty  that  by  an  inevitable  logic  drove  Kant 
to  adopt  the  "  critical  standpoint  "  properly  so  called. 
"  Knowledge  "  is  a  result  of  experience;  that  is,  cer- 
tain events  happen,  certain  sensations  are  felt,  certain 
ideas  are  gained,  and  then  the  complex  thing  termed 
knowledge  is  gradually  built  up.  So  the  question 
very  naturally  occurs,  if  synthesis  be  necessary  to 
knowledge,  how  is  it  given  in  knowledge  ?  Can  a 
principle  of  unification,  wanting  which  there  would 
be  no  knowledge,  be  placed  on  the  same  level  as  any 
one  of  the  individual  contents  of  experience  ?  Is  it, 
like  them,  no  more  than  one  among  the  numerous 
other  isolated  units  ?  It  is  to  be  remembered  that 
this  difficulty  occurred  to  Kant  before  he  had  been 
influenced  by  Hume  and  his  work.  The  precise  char- 
acter and  direction  of  this  new  force  accordingly  de- 
mands attention. 

When  this  question  respecting  the  nature  of  syn- 
thesis first  loome€  upon  Kant's  intellectual  horizon, 
he  had  decided  that  the  principle  of  synthesis  was 
to  be  classed  with  other  more  ordinary  contents  of 
knowledge.  It  grew  up,  as  they  did,  in  the  course 
of  experience.  This  provisional  answer  was  an  in- 
evitable result  of  the  separation  between  "  Pure 
•Thought"  and  "Knowledge."  The  former  being 
completely  analytic,  the  synthesis  necessarily  came 
from  the  latter,  and  was  therefore  on  precisely  the 
same  level  as  any  other  empirically  conditioned  idea. 
This  constituted  the  first  step.  But,  still  without 
acquaintance  with  Hume,  Kant  moved  another 
stadium  on  his  course.  He  discovered  that  the  syn- 
thesis involved  in  the  conception  of  Space  could  not 


16  THE  GENESIS  OF 

be  a  derivative  from  experience;  this  at  least  must 
be  placed  on  a  higher  level  than  the  knowledge  of 
any  separate  object  existing  in  it.  Why  so  ?  If  the 
synthesis  called  Space  be  obtained  during  the  process 
of  experience,  it  must  be  built  up  in  one  of  two  ways. 

(1)  In  the  course  of  life  we  meet  with  a  large  number 
of  different  kinds  of  space  and,  comparing  them,  we 
find  that  they  all  possess  an  element  in  common. 
This  we  abstract,  and  label  the  abstracted  idea  Space. 

(2)  Again,  in  the  course  of  experience  we  may  come 
to  know  numerous  different  instances  of  space,  and 
by  doing  a  small  sum  in  addition  we  may  ascend  to 
the  notion  of  Space  in  general.     That  is,  by  adding 
these  different  instances  to  one  another  we  arrive  at 
an  ampler  conception.     But  Kant  saw  by  his  own 
inward  light  that  the  conception  of  Space  is  not  de- 
rived in  either  of  these  ways.     It  is  not  a  mere  result 
of  experience,   but   a   constitutive   condition.     The 
fact  of  objects  in  space,  like  the  fact  of  different 
instances  of  space,  presupposes  one  general  Space. 
Kant,  consequently,  argued  that  an  examination  of 
the  judgments  of  perception  in  regard  to  extended 
objects  reveals  the  circumstance  that  Space  possesses 
an  existence  in  its  own  right  apart  from  which  the 
presence  of  material  objects  is  unthinkable;  that,  in 
brief,  this  is  the  prior  condition  of  the  possibility  of 

V  that  divisible  complex,  the  material  universe.  With- 
out this  determining  or  operative  conception,  experi- 
ence as  we  know  it  would  be  impossible. 

At  this  juncture,  then,  and  in  opposition  to  his 
traditional  Wolffianism,  Kant  had  urged  that  Eeason 
is  not  entirely  analytic,  and  that  one  part  of  its  syn- 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          17 

thetic  activity  cannot  but  be  an  indispensable  condi- 
tion of  the  very  existence  of  experience.  In  fact, 
he  had  already  introduced  the  thin  edge  of  the 

-•  "  transcendental "  wedge.  Hume's  influence  was 
destined  to  supply  the  motive  force  necessary  to  drive 
it  home. 

The  Scottish  skeptic  made  it  his  task  to  explain 
experience  away.  On  the  basis  of  the  assumption 
that  all  knowledge  must  ultimately  be  reduced  to  a 
question  of  isolated  impressions,,  he  undertook  to 
show  that  the  permanency  and  stability  of  experience 

-are  no  more  than  appearances;  impressions  possess  no 

-  stability,  and,  therefore,  principles  that  exercise  for- 
mative control  do  not  exist.  Among  these  supposed 
principles,  Causality  is  one  of  the  most  conspicuous. 
It  lies  at  the  foundation  of  all  science;  the  belief  in  the 

—continuance  of  the  natural  order  reposes  upon  it.  Yet, 
like  all  the  rest,  it  is  nothing  but  an  association  of 
events  which  follow  one  another  arbitrarily.  A  de- 
lusion it  cannot  but  be;  it  is  only  the  worse  for  being 
a  big  one.  The  dissolution  of  the  synthesis  of  ^ 
Casuality  by  Hume  woke  Kant  up.  He  still  sup- 
posed that  Space  was  the  only  synthesis  which  stood 
forth  as  a  condition  of  the  existence  of  experience. 
And  here,  in  Hume's  destructive  analysis,  he  was 
brought  to  see  that,  if  cause  and  effect  be  a  conse- 
quence of  experience,  it  is  of  imagination  all  compact.  , 
Kant  was  therefore  compelled  to  face  a  new  problem.  1 
Can  any  of  the  syntheses  on  which  the  unity  of  ex- 
perience reposes  be  empirically  derived?  But,  ere  this 
question  could  become  fully  apparent,  another  impli- 
cation had  to  be  taken  into  account.  The  synthesis  of 


18  THE  GENESIS  OF 

Space  and  that  of  Causality  are  not  of  precisely  the 
same  kind.  They  stand  in  different  relations  to  ob- 
jects. Space  may  very  well  be  a  condition  of  experi- 
ence, and  yet  it  may  not  be  essentially  connected  with 
any  given  object.  In  other  words,  even  if  Space  be 
a  condition  of  experience,  the  rest  of  the  process  of 
thought — that  is,  the  process  in  so  far  as  it  is  in  nec- 

— essary  relation  to  objects — may  be  analytic.  With 
Causality  the  case  is  different.  Empiricism  may 
remain  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  knowledge  even 
if  Space  be  granted  as  a  preliminary  condition,  and 
this  because  Space  is  not  indissolubly  linked  with 

I  this  or  that  thing  in  the  outer  world.     But  if  the 

J  synthesis  of  Causality  be  unobtainable  from  experi- 
ence, then  empiricism  fails;  for  Causality  is  a  syn- 
thesis of  objects  themselves.  It  deals  not  only  with 
"  mere  "  ideas,  but  with  things  "  external "  to  the 
thinker.  Kant  thus  came  to  see  that  the  synthesis 
which  he  held  to  be  present  in  experience  is  not 
derivative  in  any  sense.  The  condition  which  it  im- 
poses holds  not  only  on  the  subjective  side,  like 

-  Space,  but  also  on  the  objective,  like  Causality.  The 
exception  which  he  had  made  in  favor  of  Space 
turned  out  to  be  nothing  but  a  first  step  towards  the 
extension  of  a  similar  primacy  to  all  such  synthetic 
processes.  Hume  roused  him  to  a  sense  of  the  im- 
minent danger  involved  in  his  previous  admissions, 
and  forced  him  to  extend  all  round  the  principle 
already  known  to  him  by  his  own  unaided  reflection. 
One  step  onward  was  now  to  bring  Kant  to  the 
"critical  standpoint "  proper.  As  before,  this  ad- 
vance took  place  in  connection  with  the  emergence 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.         19 

of  a  fresh  question.  The  problem  now  occurred., 
How  can  such  synthetic  processes  be  of.  use  in  ex- 
perience if  they  take  place  within  the  subjective 
circle  of  mind  ?  At  first  sight  this  inquiry  may 
appear  somewhat  irrelevant.  Why  should  Kant  re- 
'  quire  to  ask  at  all  whether  mental  syntheses  are  of 
use  in  experience  ?  Of  course,  one  might  immedi- 
ately reply,  they  are  of  use,  because  they  offer  the 
conditions  wanting  which  there  would  not  be  any 
experience  whatsoever.  Yet,  from  Kant's  point  of 
view,  the  problem  was  not  only  relevant  but  even 
inevitable.  He  had  adopted  to  some  extent  the 
"  two-world  "  theory  of  Descartes.  The  organic  con- 
nection of  mind  and  matter  had  not  suggested  itself 
to  him  as  it  invariably  does  to  the  trained  modern 
mind.  If  there  be  a  separation,  and  if  the  synthetic 
processes  be  of  purely  mental  occurrence,  then  this 
question  obviously  •  becomes  one  of  the  last  im- 
portance. How  can  they  be  applied  to  the  "  exter- 
nal "  world  ?  Kant  had  gradually  forced  himself 
to  declare  that  mind  is  not  entirely  passive  in 
knowledge  ;  experience  could  not  be  regarded  by 
him  any  longer  as  a  mere  effect  somehow  induced 
in  mind.  Only  one  alternative  remained.  Mind 
cannot  but  exercise  a  constitutive  function.  The 
synthetic  act  looms  larger  and  larger,  till,  at  length, 
it  seems  to  assume  something  of  the  function  of  a 
'  creative  principle,  and  this  in  relation  to  objects. 
From  this  conclusion  Kant  was  also  precluded;  he 
could  not  accept  it  in  its  fulness.  For  he  held  that 
the  synthetic  activities  are  to  be  classed  with  general 
notions.  They  did  not  exist  for  him  in  the  form  of 


20  THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON. 

special  objects.  Thus  the  pressing  problem  came 
to  be,  How  are  these  purely  mental  facts  to  be  ren- 
dered useful  in  relation  to  a  material  world  from 
which  mind  naturally  stands  isolated  ?  This  is  the 
final  step  in  the  progress  towards  the  "  critical  stand- 
point "  proper. 

Here  we  break  off  our  account  for  a  moment  in 
order  to  inquire  what  precise  significance  is  to  be 
attached  to  this  technical  phrase.  Its  meaning  may 
perhaps  be  best  explained  by  reference  to  what  has 
just  been  stated.  Two  cardinal  ideas  are  involved. 
(1)  Kant  had  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  in 
knowledge  there  are  certain  synthetic  activities 
which,  like  Space,  are  conditions  of  experience.  The 
first  object  of  a  system  which  starts  with  the  intention 
of  true  "  criticism "  must  therefore  be  to  enumerate 
exhaustively  those  various  synthetic  conditions  whereon 
experience  is  based.  (2)  But,  as  Kant  considered, 
these  activities  are  characteristic  of  mind;  and  be- 
tween mind  and  external  things  there  is  a  great  gulf 
fixed.  How,  then,  can  the  mental  operations  be  of 
any  value  in  ordering  an  experience  which  at  every 
turn  seems  to  be  brought  into  connection  with  mat- 
ter ?  Coequal  in  importance  with  the  first  stands 
the  second  task  of  a  truly  "  critical "  system.  It 
must  proceed  to  show  how  the  mental  syntheses  acquire 
value  in  relation  to  that  material  world  which  consti- 
tutes one  half  of  the  universe  of  experience.  Kant  sat 
down  to  excogitate  the  "  Critique  of  Pure  Keason  " 
in  order  to  satisfy  himself  on  these  two  points. 


THE   PKOBLEM   OF   THE   "CRITIQUE   OF 
PURE  REASON." 

SYNTHESIS,  then,  furnishes  the  material  whereon 
the  "  Critique "  must  work.  Accordingly,  the 
problem  that  Kant  attacks  at  the  outset  is  found  to 
be  closely  connected  with  what  has  preceded.  The 
initial  question  propounded  in  his  great  work  is, 
"  How  are  synthetic  judgments  a  priori  possible  ?  " 
The  import  of  this  problem  may  be  stated  in  some 
such  general  way  as  follows.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  one 
that  stands  in  need  of  no  proof,  we  find  that  synthe- 
sis is  present  in  our  ordinary  experience.  Not  only 
does  mind  become  aware  seriatim  of  the  occurrences 
incident  to  daily  life,  but  ft  also  puts  them  together 
in  such  a  way  that  it  is  able  to  survey  the  past,  to 
project  itself  into  the  future.  Every  object  in  the 
external  world,  for  example,  derives  much  of  its  char- 
acteristic reality  from  the  relations  which  mind  con- 
stitutes between  it  and  other  things.  Indeed,  nothing 
stands  alone;  everything  occupies  a  certain  position, 
or  possesses  distinctive  value,  in  virtue  of  its  relations 
to  other  objects.  Thus  it  would  appear  that  in 
knowledge  mind  is  active.  For  relation  is  not  a 
definitely  existing  fact,  but  a  product  of  the  synthetic 
power  of  mind.  This  is  revealed  in  a  unifying  princi- 
ple which  binds  all  things  together,  transforming 


22  THE  PROBLEM  OF 

their  disconnection  into  the  single  harmonious  whole 
called  experience.  On  this  ground  Kant  thinks  that 
mind  is  characterized  by  the  possession  of  a  certain 
synthetic  capacity  for  judging.  But  this  is  not  all. 
The  Jggvver  of  judgment  must  be  regarded  as  also 
a  priori.  That  is  to  say,  it  condjj-wng  p]Q)grience, 
is  never  consequent  upon  it.  The  faculty  of  consti- 
tuting necessary  relations  between  objects  or  ideas 
is,  in  his  view,  a  formative  element;  apart  from  it 
experience  would  not  be  possible.  Accordingly,  the 
necessary  connection  destroyed  by  Hume  is  rein- 
stated !)v  Kant  in  the  form  of  a  property  of  mind,  or 
of  its  distinctive  contribution  to  the  formation  of 
^experience.  It  cannot  be  any  longer  regarded  as  an 
inference  worked  up  in  the  course  of  life,  it  is  no 
deduction  based  on  premises  supplied  by  empirically 
given  data;  rather  it  is  to  be  taken  as  prior  to  ex- 
perience in  the  sense  that  it  forms  the  manifesta- 
tion of  that  entity  for  which  alone  experience  is. 
Such,  then,  is  the  general  meaning  of  the  phrase 
"  synthetic  a  priori  judgment/'  •• 

It  is  needful  to  inquire  next,  what  was  the  neces- 
sity for  Kant's  question  ?  If,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
this  synthesis  be  present  in  the  most  ordinary  exhibi- 
tions of  rational  activity,  why  ask  at  all  "  how  are 
synthetic  judgments  a  priori  possible  ?  "  Kant,  as 
has  been  hinted,  had  need  to  put  this  question,  be- 
cause he  had  already  admitted  that  the  sense  impres- 
sions of  Hume  afford  us  all  that  we  know  concerning" 
the  external  world.  If  this  be  so,  it  obviously  be- 
comes a  very  essential,  though  a  very  difficult,  task 
to  learn  precisely  how  something  so  immensely  more 


TEE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          23 

potent  than  a  mere  series  of  disconnected  sensations 
conies  to  be  necessary  even  to  the  bare  recognition  of 
these  identical  sensations.  Hence  the  problem  of 
the  "  Critique  "  comes  to  be,  in  one  aspect,  the  only 
problem;  for  everything  depends  upon  the  solution 
offered  in  face  of  it.  Necessary  connection  exists. 
It  is  a  condition  of  the  possibility  of  knowledge. 
How  does  it  come  about;  how,,  in  the  circumstances, 
is  it  possible  ?  This  furnishes  Kant  with  his  start- 
ing-point, and  the  presuppositions  that  accompany 
the  mere  statement  of  such  a  question  remain  with 
him  to  the  end,  remain  long  after  he  has  shaken  him- 
self clear  of  the  immediate  difficulties  peculiar  to  the 
first  "  Critique/' 

It  may  therefore  be  well  to  elaborate  his  starting- 
•point  a  little  more  fully.  We  may  note,  at  the  out- 
set, that  he  does  not  propose  what  is  often  called  a 
"  presuppositionless  philosophy."  He  frankly  begins 
as  a  dogmatist.  Hume  had  proved  that,  if  all  knowl- 
edge be  reducible  ultimately  'to  sense  impressions, 
then  necessary  connection  simply  passes  out  of  ex- 
perience; it  does  not  enter  into  the  calculation,  so  to 
speak.  On  this  basis  things  may  be  accidentally 
conjoined,  they  can  never  be  essentially  connected. 
But,  as  Kant  dogmatically  puts  the  matter  in  reply, 
necessary  connection  cannot  be  an  affair  of  mere  de- 
lusion, because  it  is  of  daily,  common  occurrence. 
If  it  be  a  piece  of  imagination,  then  all  science  dis-v 
appears  into  thin  air;  all  common  sense  must  give  up 
its  most  solidly  based  attainments.  Space,  time, 
cause,  personality,  and  so  forth  are  notorious  facts 
incident  to  the  most  fragmentary  consciousness. 


24  THE  PROBLEM  OF 

The  sensationalist  may  analyze  as  he  pleases,  he  can- 
not explain  them  away.  They  underlie  each  and  all 
of  his  explanations  so  called.  To  attempt  to  get 
behind  them  is  like  trying  to  hold  one's  self  up  by 
one's  own  waistband.  Accordingly,  the  only  im- 
portant problem  in  connection  with  them  ought  to 
be  sought  elsewhere.  Seeing  that  inevitably  they 
must  be  taken  as  data,  the  sole  question  worth  in- 
quiring into  is,  What  do  they  signify,  or  how  are 
they  possible  ?  To  what  constitution  of  the  knowing 
mind  do  they  point;  to  what  conclusions  regarding 
the  nature,  ontological  significance,  and  the  conse- 
quent range  or  possible  limitations  of  human  knowl- 
edge ?  Or,  to  put  the  matter  in  the  briefest  possible 
way,  What  sort  of  process  is  knowledge,  and  what 
can  and  do  we  know  ?  This  is  the  problem  for 
which  the  "Critique  of  Pure  Reason"  proposes  to 
find  an  answer.  The  difficulty  comes  to  be  that  of 
accounting  for  the  fact  of  necessary  connection.  It 
is  a  real  difficulty,  because  the  synthetic  power  is 
a  priori,  while  the  impressions  furnished  by  the 
outer  world  are  as  distinctively  a  posteriori. 

All  knowledge  may  thus  be  traced  back  to  two 
sources.  The  a  posteriori  element  includes  all  that 
we  obtain  from  sense,  all  the  material  which,  accord- 
ing to  Hume,  association  and  habit  work  up  into  the 
complexities  of  experience,  jf  This,  of  course,  must 
be  regarded  as  entirely  contingent;  it  cannot  be  con- 
sidered necessary  to  the  very  being  of  knowledge. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  a  priori  syntheses  are  uni- 
versal and  necessary,  frhey  belong  to  every  think- 
ing being  alike  [  they  must  furnish  the  operative 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          25 

element  in  thought,  if  thought  is  to  manifest  itself 
nafall.  'It  may,  perhaps,  be  easy  enough  to  explain 
synthetic  judgments  a  posteriori.  Everybody  knows 
how  proverbs  arise;  we  readily  see  why  "  once  bit, 
twice  shy  "  holds  true.  But  when  we  come  to  in- 
quire why  every  person  believes  that  three  times 
twelve  are  thirty-six,  or  that  thirty-six  is  four  times 
nine  ;  and  believes,  moreover,  that  so  it  has  in- 
variably been  and  so  it  will  ever  be,  we  are  face  to 
face  with  a  problem  that  presents  unperceived  diffi- 
culties. It  is  to  such  problems  that  the  "  Critique 
of  Pure  Eeason  "  is  devoted.  That  is,  it  discusses 
principles  that  are  not  deductions  from  common  ex- 
perience, but  rather  underlie  the  very  existence  of 
experience  itself.  The  mere  fact  that  there  is 
knowledge  suggests  them;  it  suggests  them,  more- 
over, with  an  authority  and  inevitableness  that  we 
cannot  escape. 

Before  proceeding  to  an  analysis  of  the  contents 
of  the  "  Critique,"  one  further  point  demands  no- 
tice. Kant  employs  the  term  "  transcendental "  to 
distinguish  the  character  of  his  investigations.  The 
"  Critique  "  contains  a  "  Transcendental  Analytic," 
a  "  Transcendental  Dialectic,"  and  so  on.  The 
word  itself  is  surrounded  by  misleading  associations. 
The  usual  misconception  rests  upon  a  confusion. 
"  Transcendent "  is  a  sufficiently  familiar  word, 
"transcendental^"  is  not.  Naturally,  then,  the 
latter  comes  to  be  viewed  as  if  it  were  identical  with 
the  former.  Nothing  could  well  be  further  from 
Kant's  mind,  and  consequently  productive  of  com- 
plete confusion  of  thought  in  respect  to  his  meaning. 


26  THE  PROBLEM  OF 

The  "transcendent"  may  be  taken  to  imply  that 
which  is  above  or  beyond  experience.  Non-sense, 
that  which  cannot  be  formulated  in  any  clear  idea, 
some  would  regard  it.  And  it  is  to  be  feared  that 
not  a  few  tend  to  attach  this  latter  signification  to 
the  Kantian  technical  term.  But  the  "  Critique  of 
Pure  Keason,"  seeing  that  it  deals  more  strictly  with 
experience  than  many  philosophical  works,  cannot 
be  directed  to  that  which  lies  outside  of  knowledge. 
Yet  experience  may  be  regarded  from  two  sides.  One 
may  attend  either  to  the  product  or  to  the  process. 
Objects,  ideas,"  and  so  forth  may  well  be  subjects  of 
interesting  investigation.  But  they  are  secondary 
in  the  sense  that  they  depend  upon  the  mental 
processes  whereby  they  are  known.  This  is  the  more 
fundamental  aspect,  because  it  is  constitutive  of  the 
products.  They  may  or  may  not  be,  the  process 
cannot  but  be.  Now  when  Kant  employs  the 
term  "  transcendental,"  he  wishes  to  signify  that 
his  investigation  relates  to  this  more  fundamen- 
tal, or  essential,  side  of  experience.  The  transcen- 
dental is,  for  him,  the  constitutive.  We  might 
say,  for  example,  that  in  respect  of  the  physi- 
cal world,  the  principle  of  gravitation  is  constitu- 
tive. Without  it  the  material  universe  as  we  know 
it  would  not  be.  Yet,  in  our  investigations,  we  may 
turn  to  some  few  of  the  consequences  dependent  upon 
it.  These  are  necessarily  contingent;  but  the  prin- 
ciple itself  cannot  be  dispensed  with.  Kant's  phi- 
losophy is  transcendental,  because  its  object  is  to 
formulate  a  complete  account  of  all  the  constitutive 
elements  that  enter  into  experience.  The  products 


TEE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          27 

of  mental  processes  may  be  left  to  take  care  of  them- 
selves till  we  possess  a  satisfactory  account  of  the 
principles  which  invariably  enter  into  the  constitu- 
tion of  all  products  whatsoever.  The  "trans- 
cendental," then,  as  employed  by  Kant,  means  the 
primary  in  experience,  or  that  which  is  essentially 
bound  up  with  the  mental  process  of  which  knowl- 
edge of  definite  things  is  the  result. 


OUTLINE  OF  THE  CONTENTS  OF  THE 
"CKITIQUE  OF  PUKE  REASON." 

L   INTRODUCTION. 

(1)  We  do  form  synthetic  a  priori  judgments. 

(2)  In  what  way  ?  - 

(3)  In  Science. 

(4)  The  three  kinds  of  Science  : 

(a)  Mathematical  Science. 

(6)  Physical  Science. 

(c)  Metaphysical  Science. 

II.  TRANSCENDENTAL      -ESTHETIC      (Mathematical 
Science). 

(1)  What  synthetic  a  priori  judgments  are  possible 

in  Mathematical  Science. 

(2)  Those  connected  with  Number  and  Magnitude  ; 

which  involve  Time  and  Space. 

'  >A(3)  The  Metaphysical  Exposition  of  Time  and  Space. 
(4)  The  Transcendental  Exposition  of    Time  and 
Space. 

III.  TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  (Physical  Science). 

(1)  What  Synthetic  a  priori  judgments  are  possible 

in  Physical  Science. 

(2)  The  Discovery  of  the  Categories. 

(A)  Quantity. 

(a)  Singular. 

(6)  Particular  (Plural). 

(c)  Universal. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          29 

(B)  Quality. 

(a)  Affirmative. 

(6)  Negative. 

(c)  Infinite  (Limiting). 

(0)  Relation. 

(a)  Categorical. 
(6)  Hypothetical, 
(c)  Disjunctive. 
(D)  Modality. 

(a)  Problematical. 

(b)  Assertory. 

(c)  Apodictical  (Demonstrative). 

(3)  Transcendental  Deduction  of  the  Categories. 

(a)  First  Part  of  the  Deduction.  The  Cate- 
gories shown  to  be  necessary  for  the 
determination  of  objects. 

(6)  Second  Part  of  the  Deduction.  The  ob- 
jects determined  by  the  Categories 
shown  to  be  those  given  in  impressions 
of  sense. 

(4)  The  Schematism  of  the  Categories. 

(1)  The  Categories  must  be  expressed  under 

the  form  of  J[ime,  because  Time  alone 
applies  to  all  possible  thoughts. 

(2)  Table  of   the  Categories  as   schematized 

'  in  Time. 

(A)  Quantity. 

(a)  Affirmative  schematized  as 

Unity. 

(b)  Particular Plurality. 

(c)  Universal Totality. 

(B)  Quality. 

(a)  Affirmative  schematized  as 
Keality. 

(6)  Negative Negation. 

(c)  Infinite Limitation. 


30  OUTLINE  OF  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

(C)  Relation. 

(a)  Categorical  schematized  as 

Substance. 

(6)  Hypothetical . . .  Causality, 
(c)  Disjunctive Reciprocity. 

(D)  Modality. 

(a)  Problematical  schematized 
as  Possibility. 

(6)  Assertory Actuality. 

(c)  Apodictical Necessity. 

(5)  Principles  of  the  Pure  Understanding. 

(a)  Axioms  of  Intuition  (Quantity). 

(b)  Anticipations  of  Perception  (Quality). 

(c)  Analogies  of  Experience  (Relation). 

(d)  Postulates   of  Empirical  Thought    (Mo- 

dality). 

IV.  TRANSCENDENTAL      DIALECTIC      (Metaphysical 
Science). 

(1)  Is  Metaphysical  Science  possible  ? 

(2)  The  Ideas  of  Reason. 

(a)  The  Soul. 
(5)  The  Universe, 
(c)  God. 

(3)  Rational  Psychology  (The  Soul). 

(a)  The  Paralogism  of  Rational  Psychology. 

(4)  Rational  Cosmology  (The  Universe). 

The  Antinomies  of  Rational  Cosmology. 

The  First  Antinomy  :  Quantity. 

"    Second      "  Quality. 

"    Third        "  Relation. 

"    Fourth      "  Modality. 

(5)  Rational  Theology. 

(A)  The  Value  of  the  Proofs  of  the  Being  oJ 
God. 

(a)  The  Ontological  Argument. 

(b)  The  Cosinological  Argument. 


TEE  CRITIQUE  OP  PURE  REASON.          31 


(c)  The  Physico-Theological  Argument 

or  Argument  from  Design. 

(6)  Conclusion.     Within  the  limits  of  Pure  Reason 
Metaphysical  Science  cannot  be  shown  to  be 
possible, 
V.  THE  TRANSCENDENTAL  METHOD. 

(1)  The  Discipline  of  Pure  Reason. 

(2)  The  Canon  of  Pure  Reason. 

(3)  The  Architectonic  of  Pure  Reason. 

(4)  The  History  of  Pure  Reason. 


THE  CONTENTS  OF  THE  "CKITIQUE  OF 
PUKE  KEASOK" 

I.     INTRODUCTION. 

THE  contents  of  the  Introduction  have  already 
been  so  far  anticipated  that  they  may  be  sum- 
marized here  with  comparative  brevity.  The  initial 
question — "  How  are  synthetic  a  priori  judgments 
possible  ?  " — and  its  meaning  have  been  considered^ 
and  we  have  seen  how  this  problem  was  connected 
in  Kant's  mind  with  the  destructive  conclusions  of 
Hume.  A  synthesis^ consists  in  putting  elements  to- 
gether so  that  their  isolation  is  overcome,  and  a  new 
^conclusion  emerges,  one,  too,  in  which,  owing  to  the 
operation  of  the  synthetic  act,  the  original  self-con- 
LW  tained  data  have  been  transformed  to  fresh  ends. 
Further,  synthesis  tends  to  produce  necessary  and 
j-  universal  results.  To  the  mere  fact  of  occurrence,  de- 
rived from  sensation,  there  has  been  added,  by  a  crea- 
tive act,  an  entirely  different  element.  How  has  this 
been  done;  or,  \v.iat  are  the  ways  in  which  mind  tx- 
ercises  this  po\^  -  which  cannot  be  doubted,  because 
it  is  in  constant  operation  ?  When  the  probleu 
presents  itself  after  this  fashion,  it  may  be  statec 
in  another  and  more  definite  manner.  Universalit} 
or  constancy,  and  necessity  or  in  variableness,  are  the 

32 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          33 

characteristic  marks  of  science.  Till  this  stage  has 
been  reached  there  cannot  be  any  science  worthy  of 
the  name.  When  it  has  been  reached,  when  we  are 
in  a  position  to  say  that  such  and  such  must  invari- 
ably take  place,  and  that,  under  definite  circum- 
stances, it  will  always  happen,  then  we  have  come 
to  the  sphere  properly  called  science.  The  question, 
How  are  synthetic  judgments  a  priori  possible  ? 
accordingly  may  be  legitimately  stated  in  the  more 
exact  and  less  general  form,  How  is  science  possible  ? 
Looking  at  the  problem  under  this  aspect,  it  im- 
mediately becomes  apparent  that  there  are  diverse 
kinds  of  science.  Upon  reflection  it  is  found  possi- 
ble to  group  these  under  three  heads. 

(1)  Mathematical    Science.      The    subject-matter 
of  this  group  may  be  designated  the  general  con- 
ditions of  objects  ;    those  conditions  which  attach 
peculiarly  neither  to   this  nor  to   that  thing,   but 
under  which  everything  equally  becomes  known  in 
experience. 

(2)  Physical   Science.     This   has   for   its   special 
field  the  relations  of  particular  objects  to  one  an- 
other.    Here  we  get  away  from  mere  general  con- 
ditions, and  are  compelled  to  take  into  account  the 
connections  in  obedience  to  which  this  or  that  group 
of  objects,  or  any  two  objects,  come  to  take  their 
places  as  effective  components  of  experience. 

(3)  Metaphysical    Science.     Thr»    occupies    itself 
with  the  general  order  in  which  all  objects  are  in- 
volved; that  is,  with  the  universe  in  its  entirety  and 
the  conceptions  essentially  connected  therewith. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  synthetic  a  priori  judgments 


34  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

are  formed  in  all  these  scientific  groups.  All  com- 
binations of  numbers  are,  in  their  result,  universal 
and  necessary.  They  are  not  obtained  by  counting 
up  single  units  as  they  happen  to  be  met  in  the 
course  of  experience.  They  are  rather  syntheses 
which  condition  the  possibility  of  a  great  part  of 
mathematical  science.  Similarly,  the  axiomatic  con- 
clusions relative  to  the  properties  of  geometrical  fig- 
ures are  synthetic  judgments  a  priori.  They  are 
conditions  of  certain  universal  and  necessary  con-/ 
elusions  relative  to  some  ways  of  regarding  space.' 
So,  too,  in  physical  science,  some  few  universal  and 
necessary  judgments  are  the  prerequisites  of  the  very 
possibility  of  investigation.  The  persistence  of 
force,  the  indestructibility  of  matter,  the  ultimacy 
of  action  and  reaction  are  specimens  of  this  synthetic 
a  priori  power.  Likewise,  in  metaphysics,  such 
statements  as,  that  every  cilVct  must  have  a  cause, 
or  that  the  world  must  have  a  history  or  beginning  in 
time,  are  first  principles  of  a  synthetic  a  priori 
character.  For  this  reason,  then,  the  general  ques- 
tion, How  are  synthetic  a  priori  judgments  possible  ? 
may  be  broken  up  into  the  three  more  definite 
problems:  How  is  Mathematical  Science  possible  ? 
How  is  Physical  Science  possible  ?  Is  metaphysical 
;  science  possible  ?  The  main  divisions  of  the 
"  Critique "  are  dependent  upon  these  three  prob- 
lems, one  major  section  being  devoted  to  each. 

All  three,  however,  can  hardly  be  said  to  stand  on 
the  same  level.  Mathematical  science  is  a  patent 
fact.  There  is  no  need  to  prove  its  existence.  Ac- 
cordingly, one  is  entitled  to  infer  that  there  must  be 


THE   CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.         35 

an  a  priori  admixture  in  the  general  conditions 
under  which  all  objects  become  such  for  man's  ex- 
perience. The  same  holds  true  of  Physical  science. 
It  obviously  exists;  its  achievements  are  among  the 
most  potent  factors  in  the  gradual  extension  of 
knowledge.  Therefore  there  cannot  be  an  a  priori 
element  in  the  special  relations  in  which  individual 
objects  stand  to  each  other.  Kant  was  not  in  a 
position  to  take  the  same  attitude  towards  Meta- 
physical science.  His  career  to  this  point  had  been  a 
progress  away  from  metaphysic  as  understood  by 
previous  thinkers.  It  was  thus  necessary  for  him  to 
contemplate  the  possibility  that  metaphysical  science 
migjit  not  exist.  But  if  it  be  possible,  then  there 
must  be  an  a  priori  admixture  in  the  constitution  of 
the  universe  regarded  as  a  cosmos  in  contradistinc- 
tion to  a  chaos.  In  other  words,  if  it  be  j)ossj.ble  for 
man  to  obtain  an  intelligible  insight  into  the  nature 
of  the  world  as  a  whole,  then  there  must  be  an  intel- 
ligence without  answering  to  the  intelligence  within. 
But  in  Kant's  time  this  was  by  no  means  obvious. 
One  might  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  it  was  not  evident 
at  all,  for  former  metaphysicians  had  devoted  them- 
selves to  the  chasing  of  noumena,  of  creations  of 
subjective  activity,  without  any  reference  to  the 
external  universe  as  such. 

To  sum  up.  Mathematics  exists  and  is  an  intel- 
ligible science.  Therefore  the  principles  on  which 
all  mathematical  results  are  based  must  be  intel- 
ligible. They  are  necessarily  derivatives  from 
intelligence,  not  a  posteriori  information,  absent  at 
one  time,  and  then  slowly  built  up  in  the  course  of 


36  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

• 
the  isolated  occurrences  incident  to  the  progress  of 

experience.  Precisely  in  the  same  way,  because 
Physical  science  possesses  its  definite  record,  the  con- 
clusion cannot  be  avoided  that  the  Principles  of  Pure 
Understanding,  presupposed  by  all  physical  scien- 
tists, must  be  actually  in  control  of  the  material 
universe.  Things,  that  is,  are  not  mere  things,  but 
are  what  they  are  in  virtue  of  an  intelligible  element 
indissolubly  bound  up  with  their  being  for  us.  With 
Metaphysics  the  case  is  somewhat  different.  Such 
is  the  condition  in  which  that  science  finds  itself  that 
we  are  compelled  to  inquire,  Are  the  ideas  which  lie 
at  the  base  of  all  speculation  also  the  ideas  in  ac- 
cordance with  which  the  cosmos  is  framed  ? 

II.     TR AN  SCENDENT AL  .ESTHETIC.  * 

In  order  to  discover  how  synthetic  a  priori  judg- 
ments are  possible  in  mathematical  science/-which 
they  are,  seeing  that  mathematical  science  exists-|- 
it  is  necessary  to  inquire,  What  are  the  contents  of 
mathematics  ?  Now  this  science  treats  entirely  of 
subjects  which  may  be  divided  into  two  great  classes, 
viz.,  (1)  Number,  (2)  Magnitude.  The  inquiry  thus 
comes  to  be,  in  the  first  instance,  How  do  we  con- 
stitute number  and  magnitude  ?  Number  is  con- 
stituted by  the  continual  repetition  of  units,  magni- 
tude by  the  juxtaposition  or  coexistence  of  units.  But 
each  of  these  acts  takes  place  under  specific  conditions. 
The  repetition  of  units  depends  upon  the  presup- 

*  It  is  to  be  remembered  that  Kant  here  thinks  of  Mathe- 
matics as  meaning  mainly  Geometry. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          37 

• 
position  of  time  ;   the  coexistence  of  units  cannot 

take  place  unless  they  be  distributed  in  space.  The 
consequences  are  that  Space  and  Time  furnish  the 
subject-matter  of  mathematics.  Every  mathematical 
judgment  involves  one  or  the  other  or  both.  Hence 
it  is  to  be  inferred  that  these  elements  are,  or  are 
intimately  connected  with,  the  possible  a  priori 
kinds  of  synthetic  judgment  in  mathematics.  In 
other  words,  one  is  forced  to  view  them,  not  as 
special  objects,  but  as  judgments  of  the  mind.  This 
conclusion  impresses  itself  upon  us  because  of  the 
universal  validity  of  time  and  the  objective  univer- 
sality of  space.  Time  does  not  apply  to  the  present 
moment  alone,  but  invariably  from  the  most  distant 
conceivable  past,  through  the  present  with  its  quickly 
successive  experiences,  into  the  most  distant  con- 
ceivable future.  Space  is  not  the  medium  only  of 
this  object  now  before  me,  but  of  each  and  all  things 
that  can  be  possibly  denominated  objective.  To 
these  principles,  then,  every  part  of  experience  must 
be  referred;  apart  from  them,  the  knowledge  that  we 
now  possess  would  be  utterly  inconceivable.  They 
are  characterized  by  their  presentation  of  the  two 
principal  qualities  whereby  we  test  synthesis  and 
"  a-priority ;  " — they  are  universal  and  necessary. 

At  this  point  a  difficulty  emerges.  It  might 
easily  be  alleged  that,  even  granted  the  ultimacy  of 
time  and  space,  granted,  too,  that  they  are  a  priori, 
they  ought  to  be  classed  with  mere  abstract  ideas. 
Are  they  not  among  the  many  airy  nothings  woven 
by  the  mind;  indeed,  is  it  not  obvious  that  they  are 
empty  ?  Were  this  objection  valid,  there  would  be 


38  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

an  end  to  further  discussion.  Space  and  time,  for 
all  their  universality  and  the  rest,  would  cease  to  be 
of  formative  value.  Kant  accordingly  proceeds  to 
show  that  this  contention  may  be  proved  invalid, 
and  on  two  specific  grounds.  (1)  Ee verting  once 
more  to  the  universality  and  necessity  with  which  the 
mind  clothes  arithmetical  results,  we  may  say  that 
"  somehow  "  out  of  the  two  notions  of  four  and  nine, 
a  -third,  thirty-six,  is  produced.  But  this  process 
is  a  priori,  because  in  executing  it  mind  does  not  de- 
scend into  the  sphere  of  external  things,  as  it  were, 
and,  putting  four  things  and  nine  things  in  a  row, 
"  count  up  "  to  thirty-six.  Yet  if  it  be  alleged  that 
the  synthetic  process  whereby  the  mind  gains  the 
notion  of  number  and  the  attendant  idea  of  time 
results  in  no  more  than  an  abstract  conclusion,  then 
a  further  implication  is  involved.  It  is  implied  not 
merely  that  the  mind  remains  within  its  own  sub- 
jective circle,  but  that  it  cannot  stray  beyond  this 
so  as  to  be  able  to  apply  its  results  to  particular  things 
in  the  objective  world.  So  far  is  this  from  being 
the  case  that,  on  the  contrary,  mind  can  not  only 
proceed  with  this  process  in  the  abstract,  but  is  able 
to  employ  it  in  the  concrete.  On  this  ground  it  must 
be  said  that  time  and  space  are  not  simply  abstract 
ideas,  but  do  apply  as  a  matter  of  fact  to  reality.  (2) 
Again,  supposing  time  and  space  to  be  abstract 
ideas,  it  is  fair  to  conclude  that  they  must  be  char- 
acterized by  the  qualities  common  to  other  abstrac- 
tions. For,  in  the  absence  of  these,  it  would  not  be 
possible  so  to  classify  them.  Now  the  main  char- 
acteristic of  any  abstraction  consists  in  the  circum- 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          39* 

stance  that  it  is  derived  by  separating  a  common 
element  from  a  number  of  concretes  or  particulars. 
If,  then,  the  idea  of  space  were  abstract,  we  should  be 
able  to  obtain  it  in  the  usual  way.  We  should  take 
a  series  of  instances  of  space;  in  each  of  these  we 
should  detect  the  presence  of  a  common  element; 
then,  by  an  effort  of  mind,  we  should  substract  this 
and  erect  it  into  our  notion  of  space  in  general.  But, 
as  Kant  had  known  long  years  before  the  "  Critique," 
space  cannot  be  thus  obtained.  There  are  no  such 
things  as  a  series  of  instances  of  space  and  time 
from  which,  after  due  comparison  and  consideration, 
the  notions  of  space  and  time  in  the  abstract  can  be 
evolved.  "  Space  and  time  in  the  abstract "  is  a 
phrase  that  exemplifies  the  fallacy  of  reasoning  in  a 
circle,  of  "  putting  the  cart  before  the  horse."  For 
we  do  not  first  of  all  learn  the  particulars  and  from 
them  abstract  a  notion  inapplicable  to  reality.  We 
first  have  the  notions  of  space  and  time;  and  if, 
thereafter,  we  speak  of  a  space  or  a  time,  what  we 
refer  to  is  not  an  instance  of  either,  but  simply  a  part 
cut  off  from  an  original  whole — the  notion  already 
indicated.  In  his  reply  to  this  objection  Kant 
plainly  shows  the  new  drift  of  metaphysic  of  which 
he  may  be  said  to  have  been  the  originator.  Out  of 
his  objections  grow  the  two  chief  "  critical "  por- 
tions of  the  ^Esthetic. 

THE    METAPHYSICAL    EXPOSITION    OF    SPACE    AND 
TIME. 

It  is  here  required  to  show  that,  from  their  func- 
tion in  the  constitution  of  experience  itself,  Space 


•4:0  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

and  Time  must  be  both  a  priori  and  objective.  (1) 
They  are  shown  to  be  a  priori,  because  they  are 
universal  and  necessary.  Nothing  can  be  thought 
out  of  time;  in  the  same  way,  no  object  can  be  per- 
ceived out  of  space.  Thus,  simply  because  they  are 
conditions  in  the  absence  of  which  there  would  be  no 
experience  at  all,  Space  and  Time  are  proved  to  be 
a  priori.  (2)  But  they  are  more  than  this.  They 
are  not  merely  abstract  conceptions  of  the  mind; 
they  are  alsoj)£fi§ent  in  perceptive  acts  which  involve 
relationships  with  particular  objects.  In  other- 
words,  they  are  objective.  And  this  is  proved  by 
their  very  nature.  They  cannot  be  regarded  as  ab- 
stract notions,  for  no  given  space  and  no  given 
time  can  be  termed  an  instance  either  of  space  or 
time.  They  are  not  class  notions  which  contain 
under  them  a  large  number  of  individuals.  This  is 
so  because  each  special  space,  like  each  special 
time,  is  a  part  cut  off  from  a  prior  whole.  But  such 
a  statement  implies  that  ideas  of  this  kind  are  homo- 
geneous. They  may  contain  particulars  in  them 
as  parts;  they  never  subsume  tnem,  or  take  them  into 
themselves,  as  instances.  Accordingly,  Space  and 
Time  are  to  be  regarded  as  both  a  priori  and  objec- 
tive. They  are  a  priori  perceptions;  and  this  is 
found  positively  from  their  essential  nature. 

THE    TRANSCENDENTAL    EXPOSITION    OF    SPACE    AND 
TIME. 

Here  the  same  subject  is  approached  from  a  some- 
what different  standpoint.  The  proof  given  runs 
along  negative,  rather  than  positive,  lines.  It  is  re- 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          43 

to  the  discovery  of  the  Categories.  The  Categories 
may  be  defined  as  forms  of  judgment  involved  in 
experience  of  the  relation  between  objects. 

THE    DISCOVERY    OF    THE    CATEGORIES. 

Here  we  at  once  come  upon  traces  of  Kant's  early 
training  in  Wolffianism.  He  is  seeking  for  what 
he  calls  "  functions  of  unity."  That  is  to  say,  he 
addresses  himself  to  the  task  of  discovering  the 
modes  whereby  things  are  put  together  in  course  of 
the  elaboration  experience.  The  faculty  that  en- 
ables man  thus  to  function  is  termed  Judgment. 
Now  Judgment  is  one^of  the  three  main  divisions 
into  which  the  field  of  Formal  Logic  is  divided. 
Accordingly,  Kant  very  naturally  thought  that  the 
analogy  from  Logic,  which  held  in  the  ^Esthetic, 
would  be  equally  serviceable  in  the  Analytic.  Simple 
apprehension,  or  the  knowing  of  single  concepts, 
takes  place  under  the  conditions  of  time  ;  so  it 
might  be  supposed  that  the  particular  relations  be- 
tween objects  would  be  likely  to  take  place,  in  the 
same  way,  under  the  forms  of  Judgment  usually  set 
forth  by  Logic.  These  forms  of  Judgment,  then, 
Kant  assumes.  He  does  not  "  discover  "  them  in  any 
proper  sense  or  this  term,  he  merely  adopts  them 
much  as  he  find,0,  them.  This  was  a  tendency  due  in 
large  part  to  his  previous  training. 

Later  thinkers,  who  have  shaken  themselves  free 
from  the  superstition  of  Formal  Logic,  thanks  very 
largely  to  Kant  ,3  own  work,  commonly  view  this 
procedure  as  a  nost  unfortunate  error.  It  is  true 


44  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

that  a  search  for  "  functions  of  unity "  has  been 
instituted;  it  is  also  true  that  Judgment  is  a  unify- 
ing faculty.  But  it  is  not  similarly  true  that  we 
are  looking  for  bare  forms  of  unity.  Now  Kant 
thought  that  the  forms  of  Judgment  would  afford 
him  a  satisfactory  enumeration  of  the  a  priori  syn- 
theses involved  in  the  relations  which  T;he  living 
mind  constitutes  between  real  objects.  On  the  basis 
of  a  separation  between  form  and  matter  he  sought 
to  find  in  the  former  taken  by  itself  solution  of  a 
problem  that  deals  as  essentially  with  the  latter.  To 
some  extent,  Kant  was  himself  aware  of  this  limit- 
ation. He  knew  that  Formal  Logic  furnishes  no 
more  than  a  test  of  consistency;  and  he  desired  a 
"  Transcendental "  Logic,  one  that  would  afford  a 
test  of  truth.  But,  unfortunately,  truth  is  depend- 
ent upon  matter  no  less  than  upon  form.  If,  when 
all  the  forms  of  Judgment  have  been  duly  enumer- 
ated and  put  in  their  proper  category  classes,  it  be 
then  supposed  that  we  have  set  forth  all  the  ways 
in  which  our  conceptions  of  objects  may  be  unified, 
we  have  fallen  under  a  delusion.  And  this  was 
Kant's  assumption.  He  stated  no  more  than  the 
limitations  within  which  such  a  synthesis  may  be 
made.  For  example,  were  one  to  i.ssert,  "If  gold 
is  a  metal,  it  is  fusible/'  all  that  would  be  implied 
would  be  the  condition  of  the  inclusion  of  the  con- 
ception "  fusible  "  in  that  of  "  gold. '  No  particular 
kind  of  unity  is  indicated,  only  the  imitation  within 
which  a  certain  unity  may  be  alleged.  Now  Kant 
was  in  search,  not  of  conditions,  but  of  kinds,  of 
unity.  In  proceeding,  then,  to  review  his  discussion 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.  4:5 

of  the  categories,  we  must  bear  in  mind  the  restric- 
tions which  he  unconsciously  imposed  on  himself  by 
simply  confining  himself  to  the  list  presented  by 
Formal  Logic,  instead  of  going  on  to  show  actually 
how  the  categories  arise  in  those  organic  interrela- 
tions which  emerge  successively  in  the  course  of 
experience.  (A  list  of  the  Categories  as  set  forth  by 
Kant  is  given  on  pp.  28-29.) 

TBAKSCEXDEKTAL    DEDUCTION    OF   THE    CATEGOKIES. 

Of  all  notable  thinkers,  Kant  is  among  the  most 
conspicuous  for  use  of  a  technical  phraseology  all 
his  own.  We  must,  therefore,  inquire  at  this  point, 
What  is  the  import  of  the  somewhat  cabbalistic 
phrase,  ' '  Transcendental  Deduction  of  the  Cate- 
gories "  ?  As  in  the  case  of  Space  and  Time,  so 
here,  in  that  of  the  Categories,  the  fact  of  their 
a  priori  nature,  like  that  of  their  objective  applica- 
tion, stands  in  need  of  proof.  The  a  priori  char- 
acter of  the  Categories  is  self-evident.  We  know 
that  they  are  the  fprrns  of  Judgment.  We  also 
know  that  if  Judgment  were  notexercised  experience 
would  be  non-existent.  Specifically,  Judgment  is  a 
condition  of  experience,  and  therefore  it  is  plain 
that  its  forms  must  be  a' priori.  But  there  is  no 
such  royal  road  to  a  solution  of  the  second  problem. 
The  objective  application  of  the  Categories  still 
remains  a  moot  point.  Now  the  Transcendental 
Deduction  is  a  piece  of  machinery  invented  for  the 
purpose  of  overcoming  this  difficulty.  It  is  de- 
vised in  order  to  help  Kant  to  prove  that  the  Cate-X 


4:6  THE  CONTENTS   OF 

gories  are  not  only  a  priori,  but  also  objective.  But, 
in  order  to  accomplish  this  aim  completely,  two  tasks 
must  be  satisfactorily  performed.  (1)  It  must  be 
shown,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  Categories  are 
indispensable  for  the  determination  of  objects.  That 
is  to  say,  the  fact  that  in  experience  thought  cannot 
say  anything  of  an  object  except  it  apply  one  of  the 
Categories  must  be  firmly  established.  It  must  be 
shown  that  no  judgment  concerning  objectivity  is 
possible  unless  one  or  more  of  the  forms  of  judgment 
intervene.  ISTo  object  can  become  the  subject  of  a 
judgment  unless  it  be  brought  under  a  category  : 
therefore  the  category  must  be  capable  of  objective 
a  j  > plication.  Firmly  to  base  conviction  of  this  con- 
stitutes the  first  task  of  the  Deduction.  (2)  One 
would  naturally  infer  that  a  complete  proof  of  this 
first  point  might  suffice  to  demonstrate  the  objective 
validity  of  the  forms  of  Judgment.  But  such  was 
Kant's  situation  that  this  did  not  hold  true  for  him. 
Simply  because  he  had  contemplated  the  severance 
of  mind  from  matter,  there  was  no  guarantee  that 
the  Categories,  even  if  proved  thus  to  be  objective, 
really  were  applied  to  the  objects  of  which  we  gain 
experience  through  the  medium  of  the  senses.  On 
the  basis  of  the  two-world  theory,  it  may  be  per- 
fectly true  that  no  judgment  can  possibly  be  made 
concerning  any  object  which  does  not  imply  the  use 
of  one  or  other  of  the  Categories;  but  it  may  be  true 
at  the  same  time  that  the  object  so  judged  is  a  mere 
subjective  creation  quite  independent  of  the  stimuli 
of  sensation.  (Accordingly,  for  one  in  Kant's  diffi- 
culty the  Deduction  is  bound  to  prove  not  only  that 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          47 

the  Categories  are  necessary  for  the  determination 
of  objects,  but  also  that  the  objects  which  they  thus 
determine  are  identical  with  those  which  we  know 
in  relation  to  the  a  posteriori  element  of  sensation) 
On  Kant's  assumptions,  we  have  no  direct  knowledge 
of  objects  existing  externally  to  us  in  the  world;  we 
become  aware  of  them  indirectly  through  the  med- 
ium of  sensation.  Consequently  the  Deduction 
must  show  that  the  objects  for  the  determination  of 
which  the  Categories  are  necessary,  and  by  the  de- 
termination of  which  they  are  proved  objective,  are 
those  which  we  come  to  know  indirectly  through 
the  interposition  of  sensation.  This  portion  of  the 
"  Critique  "  thus  falls  into  two  distinct  halves. 

First  Part  of  the  Deduction. 

Here  it  is  required  to  prove  that  the  Categories 
are  necessary  for  the  determination  of  objects.     The 
aim  is  to  show  that  they  are  objective  as  well  as 
a  priori.     (I)  Kant  proceeds  to  prove  at  the  outset 
that,  unless  all  objects  were  related  to  one  self,  there 
would  be  no  knowledge.  If  there  be  no  permanent  ego 
which  remains  unchanged  throughout  the  passing 
flux  of  experience,  then  sensation  cannot  be  arrested, 
much  less  worked  up  into  the  elaborate  complexities 
of  knowledge.     Or,  to  employ  Kant's  own  technical  \ 
language,  objects  cannot  be  characterized  as  such   \ 
except  by  the  synthesis  of  their  manifold  in  rela- 
tion to  an  identical  self.     By  this  he  means  that  all    , 
the  varied  sensations  connected  with  an  object  must 
necessarily  be  held  together  and  united  by  a  single 


48  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

self  that  remains  unchanged,  throughout  the  entire 
course  of  their  rapid  alterations.  (2)  Having  thus 
pointed  out  that,  even  to  the  mere  naming  of  an 
object  as  such,  an  active,  synthetic  sell  is  necessary, 
Kant  next  proceeds^  to  show  that  the  forms  under 
which  this  unifying  activity  takes  place  are  the 
Categories;  that,  in  fact,  the  Categories  are  objective, 
because  through  them  the  permanent  self  character- 
izes objects  as  objects.  From  what  has  immediately 
preceded  we  are  aware  that  knowledge  is  possible 
only  because  an  identical  self  performs  the  operation 
of  binding  together  passing  sensations.  JThe  charac- 
teristic of  this  ego  lies  in  its  synthetic  office)  How, 
then,  is  this  synthesis  brought  about  ?  As  we  have 
already  seen,  by  the  faculty  of  judgment.  But  Kant, 
following  the  tradition  of  Formal  Logic,  supposed 
that  the  Categories  exhaust  the  channels  through 
which  this  faculty  exhausts  its  possibilities  of  ac- 
tion. Hence  they  are  the  forms  whereby  this  syn- 
thesis is  executed,  and  so  they  are  objective  in  their 
primary  nature.  No  doubt  this  can  be  regarded 
as  true  so  far  as  it  goes.  Yet  it  must  be  remembered 
that  Kant  erred  in  thinking  that  the  bare  forms  of 
Judgment  supplied  all  the  necessary  Categories.  He 
left  matter  out  of  the  reckoning,  and  so  missed  what 
he  really  sought,  which  was,  not  the  form  of  judg- 
ment, but  the  form  of  unity  involved  in  every  act  of 
judgment.  Be  this  as  it  may,  however,  he  had  taken 
one  great  step  in  advance.  He  had  clearly  grasped 
the  circumstance  that  in  judgment,  the  unit  of 
knowledge,  there  is  invariably  a  union  of  conceptions 
which,  moreover,  is  not,  and  cannot  be,  given  in 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.         49 

sense.  It  is  true  that  he  arrives  at  the  necessity 
for  Categories  and  at  their  objective  application; 
it  is  also  true  that  his  inferences  imply  much  more 
than  he  himself  was  aware  of.  His  conclusion  here, 
then,  is  that  the  Categories  are  the  sole  forms  of  that  . 
faculty  whereby  the  self — a  permanent  element  nec- 
essary to  knowledge — unifies  the  flux  of  experience 
so  that  it  attains  the  wholeness  and  orderliness  of 
knowledge.  From  this  point  of  view,  accordingly, 
the  Categories  must  be  regarded  as  objective;  with- 
out them,  there  could  not  be  any  objects  at  all. 

Second  Part  of  the  Deduction. 

It  is  now  necessary  to  prove  that  the  objects  for 
the  determination  of  which  the  Categories  are  req- 
uisite are  the  objects  of  which  we  obtain  indirect 
knowledge  through  the  medium  of  sensation.  We  > 
are  aware  that  the  mind  must  be  active  in  the  up- 
building of  experience;  that  this  activity  is  synthetic' 
in  nature;  that  the  forms  of  this  synthesis  are  the 
Categories.  But  we  do  not  know  that  the  objects 
which  are  thus  synthetized  are  those  given  through 
the  senses  under  the  general  fornis~oi^  Space  and 
Time.  Moreover,  it  is  essential  that  this  open  ques- 
tion should  be  settled.  Otherwise,  it  might  well  be 
that  we  were  denizens  of  two  worlds.  One  of  these 
would  be  that  created  by  the  action  of  the  Cate- 
gories, the  other  that  apprehended  through  sense 
under  the  conditions  of  Space  and  Time.  And,  if 
this  were  true,  then  it  would  become  necessary  to 
relegate  each  mental  experience  to  one  or  other  of 


50  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

these  contrasted  universes  ere  we  could  definitely  tell 
whether  the  Categories  were,  or  were  not,  objective 
in  their  application.  Kant  now  proceeds  to  dis- 
charge this  new  obligation ;  the  Categories  must 
be  applied  only  to  the  material  offered  by  sensation. 

(1)  In  the  first  place,  he  shows  negatively  that, 
•unites  the  Categories  were  applied  to  the  matter  of 
,  they  would  have  no  value.  This  point  is  im- 
portant as  evincing  his  appreciation  of  the  organic 
nature  of  experience.  The  Categories  are  potential 
forms  which  only  display  their  power  in  relation  to 
suitable  material.  Supposing  that  all  our  knowl- 
edge "  came  from  within/' — that  is,  granting  that 
mind  were  a  sort  of  mill  grinding  out  ideas  for  in- 
dividual use, — then  there  would  be  no  necessity  for 
Categories.  If  confined*  within  its  own  circle,  mind 
is  already  a  unity;  there  is  nothing  that  stands  in 
need  of  being  "  brought  in."  Consequently  there  is 
no  function  which  a  unifying  process  can -well  sub- 
serve. Consequently,  because  the  Categories  exist 
as  forms  of  synthesis  they  must  be  applied  to  that 
portion  of  knowledge  which  comes  to  the  mind,  as 
it  were,  from  some  sphere  external  to  itself.  The 
a  priori  element  is  what  it  is  only  by  contrast  with 
i  the  a  posteriori.  Or,  to  put  the  matter  otherwise, 
from  the  very  fact  that  they  are  necessary,  the  Cate- 
gories are  applied  to  that  element  in  experience 
which  is  derived  from  sense;  for  sensation  is  the  sole 
source  of  our  knowledge  of  external  objects.  The 
Categories  determine  sensations  and  bring  them  to 
unity.  They  determine  the  matter  too,  and  not 
merely  the  form,  seeing  that  form  has  no  existence 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          51 

apart  from  matter.  (^Seeing,  then,  that  sensation  sup- 
plies the  only  "  foreign  "  element  in  knowledge,  that 
the  Categories  to  be  such  have  to  be  applied  to  some 
such  element,  it  follows  that  they  are  applied  to 
what  we  know  of  things  through  the  medium  of 
sense.  Unless  they  were  so  applied,  there  would  be  no 
Categories,  and  they  are  familiar  portions  of  our  ex- 
periential equipment.  Such  is  the  negative  proof. 

(2)  We  next  pass  to  the  positiv^jmJb'f  that  the 
Categories  are  applied  to  the  matter  of  sense  appre- 
hended under  the  general  forms  of  Space  and  Time. 
When  we  unify  things  in  space  we  say  that  they  are 
coexistent;  when  we  unify  them  in  time,  we  say  that 
they  are  simultaneous  or  sequent.  That  is,  the  per- 
manent self  relates  two  present  objects  in  a  particular 
way,  or  it  connects  a  past  object  with  one  now  pres- 
ent. The  mind  passes  through  a  synthetic  process j 
by  means  of  which  it  binds  together  into,  a  single 
unity  things  which  are  not  necessarily  related  to  one 
another.  The  question  thus  comes  to  be,  How  is 
this  process  executed  ?  The  answer  is,  By'  the  . 
faculty  of  Judgmen^  ;  and  .this,  in  turn,  exhibits 
itself  in  the.  Categories.  Hence  it  is  obvious  that  the 
Categories  are  applied  to  the  matter  of  sense,  or,  as 
one  might  otherwise  say,  to  the  objects  apprehended 
under  the  forms  of  Space  and  Time.  For  the  process  ) 
of  Judgment  must  apply  to  objects  so  apprehended; 
consequently,  the  >  Categories  are  applied  to  the 
world  as  known  through  the  medium  of  sensation. 

At  the  close  of  the  Deduction  we  know  that  the 
Categories  are  a  priori;  that  their  activity  in  the 
process  of  constituting  experience  takes  the  shape 


52  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

of  an  application  of  their  forms  to  the  matter  of  sense 
apprehended  under  Space  and  Time.  In  brief,  the 
Categories  are  now  seen  to  be  a  priori  conceptions. 
Without  them  the  flux  of  sensation  would  possess  no 
meaning  cognizable  by  us.  On  the  other  hand,  ex- 
perience ties  the  Categories  down ;  they  cannot 
create  something  out  of  nothing.  Without  the 
a  posteriori  matter  of  sense  they  would  be  mere  pos- 
sibilities. Work  in  a  mental  vacuum  they  might; 
but  we  should  not  be  aware  of  their  existence,  for 
they  would  not  be  productive  of  definite  knowledge. 
Sensation  and  the  forms  of  Judgment  are  thus  in- 
dissolubly  linked  together.  Neither  looms  up  into 
the  vision  of  man's  experience  in  separation  from  the 
other.  They  may  be  two  streams,  as  it  were;  we 
know  them  only  after  they  have  commingled.  Or, 
as  Kant  himself  says,  "  Perceptions  without  con- 
ceptions are  blind;  conceptions  without  perceptions 
are  empty." 

THE   SCHEMATISM   OF   THE   CATEGOKIES. 

This  is  another  part  of  the  Kantian  machinery 
rendered  necessary  by  the  separation  between  the 
matter  of  sense  and  the  forms  of  the  mind.  In  the 
Deduction  it  has  been  proved  that  the  Categories, 
or  forms  of  the  Understanding,  must  be  applied  to 
the  matter  of  sense.  This  process  is  an  indispens- 
able condition  of  the  being  of  experience.  But  it  so 
happens  that,  in  Kant's  view,  the  elements  incident 
to  this  process  are  quite  diverse  in  their  nature. 
Sensation  comes  from  without  in  the  course  of  ex- 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          53 

perience;  it  is  "  crass  "  and  a  posteriori.     The  Cate- 
gories come  from  the  mind;  they  are  "  pure  "  and 
a  priori.     Consequently  it  is  impossible   to   apply 
the  latter  directly  to  the  formeE     One  might  say 
that  the  two  groups  inhabit  different  spheres,  and 
that  by  no  known  process  can  they  pass  from  one  to 
the   other.     The.  Categories   are  the   forms   of  the 
a  priori  synthetic,  or  constitutive,  power  of  mind. 
The   matter   of  sense   is   the   a  posteriori   formless 
stuff  derived  from  the  external  world  in  the  ordi-    ^ 
nary  lapse  of  experience.     Because  the  two  are  thus  .> 
essentially  diverse  from  one  another  it  becomes  a* 
very  real  problem  to  understand  precisely  how  they  \ 
can  be  so  brought  into  contact  as  to  cooperate  in  the 
production   of  a  single   result.     The   conclusion  is 


plain,  that  they  cannot  come,  or  be  brought,  into 
direct  relationship.  Accordingly  it  becomes  imper- 
ative to  mediate  between  them.  And  this  can  be 
accomplished  in  one  way  only.  Some  third  ele- 
ment must  be  discovered  that  partakes  in  the  nature 
of  both  the  others.  Matter,  a  posteriori  characteristics, 
perceptions,  stand  on  the  one  side  ;  form,  a  priori 
qualities,  conceptions,  occupy  the  other.  Is  there 
any  faculty  that  can  so  "  schematize  "  either  as  to 
bring  it  into  relation  with  its  opposite,  yet,  by  a 
strange  paradox,  its  correlative,  factor  in  experience  ? 
Kant  thinks  that  there  is  such  a  faculty;  and  that 
it  has  the  power  of  so  treating  the  Categories  as  to 
render  them  conformable  to  this  scheme.  .Thet 
office  of  Imagination  is  to  "  schematize  "  the  Cate-j 
gories.  It  must  act  as  a  "  go-between  "  for  the 
pure  a  priori  syntheses  of  the  Understanding  and 


*\ 


54  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

the  formless  a  posteriori  matter  of  sense.  But, 
before  this  process  can  be  intelligently  understood, 
we  must  reckon  with  ourselves  in  respect  to  the  im- 
port of  the  technical  term  "  schematism." 

To  schematize,  then,  means  to  make  a  schema. 
Now  a  schema  corresponds  very  much  to  what  logi- 
cians call  a  "  general  term/'  Take,  for  example,  any 
class-notion,  such  as  "  book."  When  we  employ  the 
term  book  in  the  abstract,  Imagination  presents  to 
us  the  image  of  a  book  already  known  in  the  course 
of  experience,  even  although  at  the  moment  the  term 
may  have  no  special  reference.  Abstraction — the 
pure  form — and  intuition — the  object  now  and  here 
present — are  conciliated  when  the  former  is  appre- 
hended as  if  it  were  the  latter.  We  "cannot  fully 
realize  in  thought  the  qualities  that  attach  to  the 
abstract  term  "  humanity  "  unless  we  rest  them,  so 
to  speak,  upon  a  man.  The  individual  object  and 
the  general  idea  occur  together  in  this  way.x  In 
other  words,  we  use  a  term  which  is  at  once  general 
and  particular.)  Our  example  may  apply  to  any  pos- 
sible book,  yet  we  cannot  "  hold  it  up  before  the 
mind  "  without  thinking  of  an  individual  applica- 
tion; this  alone  enables  us  to  attain  a  clear  notion— 
a  notion  possessed  of  definiteness.  An  image  of  this 
sort,  which  may  be  called  a  particular  doing  duty 
as  if  it  were  a  universal,  Kant  terms  a  "  schema." 
It  has  in  it  the  possibility  of  universal  application 
within  the  class  it  designates,  and  yet  it  finds  em- 
bodiment in  a  special  case.  ^Imagination  is  the 
faculty  that  enables  us  to  sustain  this  apparently 
incongruous  compound,  J 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          55 

How,  then,  does  the  production  of  such  an  image 
by  the  faculty  of  Imagination  aid  us  in  the  case  now 
under  discussion  ?  How  can  it  mediate  between  the 
matter  of  sense  and  the  forms  of  the  mind  ?  Ac- 
cording to  Kant's  doctrine,,  it  would  appear  that 
knowledge  is  a  complex  of  two  totally  different  in- 
gredients. Ere  experience  can  take  place  these  op- 
posites  must  •••  somehow  or  other  have  operated  upon 
one  another,  and  have  come  to  disappear,  so  far  as 
their  isolated  existence  is  concerned,  in  a  result 
which  impliesthe_presence  of  Jboth  and  yet  of  neither 
in  its  original  purity.  What  exactly  is~tKe^pfocess 
covered  by  the  vague  phrase  "  somehow  or  other  "  ? 
The  solution  of  this  difficulty  is  not  far  to  seek. 
The  perceptions  which  sensation  supplies  are  at  the 
moment  of  cognition  brought  under  one  or  other  of 
the  general  conditions  of  Space  and  Time.  It  is 
thus  plain  that,  even  if  the  matter  of  sense  contain 
no  a  priori  element  in  itself,  it  still  must  involve 
such  factors  ere  it  can  become  matter  of  sense  for 
us.  To  be  matter  of  sense  which  enters  as  an  ef- 
fective component  into  experience  it  must  be  pre- 
sented under  the  a  priori  conditions  of  Space  and 
Time.  We  may,  accordingly,  summarize  the  pri- 
mary elements  incident  to  experience  as  three  in 
number.  First,  and  lowest,  the  "crass"  and  en- 
tirely a  posteriori  matter  of  sense.  Second,  and 
highest,  the  pure  a  priori  forms  of  the  mind,  the 
Categories.  Third,  and  intermediate  between  these 
two,  the  general  conditions  Space  and  Time.  These 
agree  with  the  first  in  so  far  as  they  must  be  viewed 
as  perceptions,  not  conceptions;  they  agree  with  the 


56  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

second  in  so  far  as  they  must  be  characterized  as 
a  priori,  not  a  posteriori.     Space  and   Time  thus 
stand  between  the  two  extremes,  and  present  ele- 
j-  ments    of    relationship    to    both.      They    are    not 
a  posteriori  perceptions,  like  sensations,  nor  a  priori 
conceptions,    like    the     Categories ;    but     they    are 
a  priori  perceptions.     They  agree  with  the  sense  mat- 
UT  in  perceptive  character,  and  with  the  Categories 
j  in  their  a  priori  nature.     It  is  consequently  evident 
that   Imagination,    in   its   process   of   schematizing, 
/must  mediate  between  the  extremes  by  using  the 
|  mean.     It  must  picture  the  universal  Categories  in 
I  such  a  particular  way  that  they  may  fall_under  the 
general  conditions  of  Space  and  Time.     It  will  thus 
bring  them  down  from  the  high  a  priori  sphere,  and 
so  render  them  applicable  in  the  workaday  world  of 
practical  experience.     If  this  descent  can  be  com- 
passed, it  will  become  feasible  to  apply  the  once  pure 
forms  to  the  matter  of  sense. 

But  a  fresh  difficulty  emerges  at  this  juncture. 
Space  and  Time  are  by  no  means  of  equally  wide 
application.  Many  occurrences  incident  to  experi- 
ence have  no  necessary  reference  to  Space.  On  the 
other  hand,  no  part  of  experience  whatsoever  can 
take  place  outside  of  the  conditions  laid  down  by 
Time.  It  thus  happens  that  the  operation  of  Im- 
agination in  schematizing  the  Categories  would  be 
of  imperfect  effect  were  it  confined  to  their  expres- 
sion under  the  form  of  Space.  /Accordingly  the 
phrase  "  Schematism  of  the  Categories  "  is  to  be  in- 
terpreted as  implying^ jfcheir_  restatement  by  the 
faculty  of  Imagination  under  the  general  condition 


'  rTy 

CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON. 

^_ 

of  TimeT?  Space  may  be  dismissed  as  insufficient 
for  the  purpose  on  hand.  Imagination,  then,  must 
reproduce  the  Categories  under  the  form  of  Time. 
(A  list  of  the  Categories  as  thus  re-expressed  is  given 
at  pp.  29-30.) 

The  Categories  as  Schematized. 

(1)  Quantity  as  reproduced  under  the  conditions  of 
Time  will"  he  indicated  by  the  continual  addition 
of  units,  that  is  to  say,  by  Number.     Taking  number,  • 
then,  and  interrupting  the  enumeration  at  the  begin- 
ning, we  get  Unity.     Go  on  with  the  process  of 
adding  units  and  we  arrive  at  Plurality.     Grasp  the 
units  so  added  and  treat  them  as  if  they  were  a 
single  whole,  and  you  achieve  Totality. 

(2)  Quality,   if  reproduced   under   the   limits   of 
Time,  is  to  be  viewed  as  degree  or  the  filling  of  i 
time.  '  Thus  we  have  Reality,  or  time  filled;  Nega- 
tion, or  time  empty;  time  partially  filled  and  parti- 
ally empty,  or  Limitation. 

(3)  Relation  as  expressed  under  the  form  of  Time  , 
comes  to  be  order  in  time.    Permanence  in  time  gives 
us  Substance.     Regularity  of  succession  in  time  af- 
fords Causality.     Coexistence,  or  "  side-by-sideness  " 
in  time,  produces  Reciprocity. 

(4)  Modality  deals  with  the  r^ature  or  kind  of  a 
thing,  and  is  therefore  to  be  expressed  as  conformity 
to  the   conditions   of   Time.      This   supplies,   first, 
Possibility,  which  implies  that  the  picture  we  frame 
of  different  occurrences  of  the  same  object  conforms 
with  the  condition  of  Time  in  general.     Under  these 


58  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

conditions  a  synthesis  is  possible.  Actuality  has  the 
implication  of  existence  in  a  given  time.  Lastly, 
existence  which  has  been,  is,  and  ever  will  be  is 
Necessity.  That  is,  it  can  be  identified  with  ex- 
istence in  all  time. 

We  may  here  pause  for  a  moment  in  order  to 
gather  up  results.  In  the  Analytic  Kant  has  all 
along  been  thinking  of  Physical  science.  To  this 
point  two  very  important  facts  have  been  abundantly 
discussed.  In  the  first  place,  it  has  been  shown 
that,  from  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  our  experience 
of  the  relations  between  particular  objects  contains 
an  a  priori  element.  Secondly,  we  have  learned 
that  the  Categories  are  the  forms  of  a  priori  synthe- 
sis whereby  we  make  judgments  concerning  objects. 
Further,  they  are  applicable  to  the  matter  of  sense 
under  the  general  form  of  Time.  Having  completed 
this  survey  with  these  results,  Kant  immediately  pro- 
ceeds to  show  how  the  principles  thus  elucidated 
apply  in  the  actual  syntheses  of  experience. 

PRINCIPLES    OF    THE    PURE    UNDERSTANDING. 


We  have  seen  that  syntheticjg^r^rt  judgments  arc 
possible  in  Physical  science^  These  judgments  are 
the  Categories.  Now  we  pass  to  a  new  question. 
G-HUiled  rKaFthis  is  the  fact,  what  can  we  say  of  the 
field  of  Physical  science  —  that  is,  of  Nature,  —  seeing 
that  it  is  subject  to  determination  by  the  Cate- 
gories ?  Or,  when  the  Categories  are  applied  to  the 
objects  of  Physical  science,  what  do  they  import  ? 
According  to  Kant,  the  Principles  of  the  Pure 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          59 

Understanding  are  the  synthetic  a  priori  judgments -.  j 
which  the  Categories  place  us  in  a  position  to  make  [j 
in  regard  to  Nature.     They  naturally  fall  into  four 
classes,  one  corresponding  to  each  of  the  main  di- 
visions of  the  Categories. 

(1)  The  first  division  relates  to  Quantity,  and  is 
known  by  the   name  Axioms   of  ^Intuition.     It   is 
based  directly  on  the  principle  that  every  intuition 
has  a  definite  quantity.     There  can  be  no  perception 
of  objects  which  lack  the  mark  of  quantity.     "  All 
sensibly  perceived   phenomena   have   magnitude   of 
extension,  or  are  extensive  quantities."     This  is  evi- 
dent from  the  fact  that  they  are  all  in  Space  and 
Time.      From    this    circumstance    certain    of    the 
axiomatic  principles  of  Mathematics  flow.     Between 
two  points  there  can  be  only  one  straight  line;  two 
straight  lines  can  never  enclose  a  space.     The  appli- 
cation of  the  Categories  to  the  world  of  nature,  so 
far  as  Quantity  is  concerned,  teaches  us  that  every 
perception  must  possess  a  form.     In  other  words, 
the  methods  of  Physical  science  are  strictly  relative 
to  phenomena  of  the  external  world,  and  are  conse- 
quently   inapplicable    in    any    explanation    of    the 
process  whereby  this  world  is  apprehended.     This  is 
one  of  Kant's  most  important  and  historically  in- 
fluential conclusions. 

(2)  The  second  division  of  the  Principles  of  the 
Pure  Understanding  relates  to  Quality,  that  is,  to 
the  quality  of  the  content  of  perception.       Hence 
its  name,  Anticipations  of  Perception.     It  depends 
upon  the  underlying  principle  that  every  perception 
cannot  but  possess  degree.     This  fact  supplies  us 


60  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

with  a  reason  a  priori,  inevitably,  for  anticipating 
that  the  matter  of  sensation  which  we  find  in  all 
perceptions  will  be  measurable  on  account  of  its 
quality.  Conception  must  be  empty  without  the 
matter  supplied  by  sense.  Or,  to  vary  the  expression, 
Anticipations  of  Perception  inform  us  prophetically, 
as  it  were,  that  it  is  not  within  the  bounds  of  reason- 
able possibility  that  we  should  ever  perceive  nothing, 
although  of  course  this  will  not  deter  some  from 
the  delight  incident  to  perceiving  the  infinitely 
little. 

These  two  sets  of  principles  apply  to  all  percep- 
tions in  general.  The  two  following  groups,  seeing 
jthat  they  are  connected  with  Relation  and  Mode, 
(have  special  appositeness  in  connection  with  judg- 
ments in  which  particular  relations  between  objects 
occur. 

(3)  The  Principles  connected  with  Relation  are  to 
be  found  in  perceptions  which  involve  one  or  other 
of  the  three  Categories,  Substance,  Causality,  and 
Reciprocity.  They  are  termed  Analogies  of  Ex- 
.  perience.  We  judge,  first,  that  Substance  remains 
one  and  the  same  throughout  all  change.  It  per- 
sists. Second,  we  infer  that  every  change  is  re- 
ferable to  cause.  Third,  we  reason  that  all 
things  which  coexist  act  and  react  apon  each 
other.  This  is  but  another  series  of  instances 
of  the  truth  on  which  Kant  has  been  insisting 
throughout,  namely,  ^that  no  knowledge  can  take 
place  apart  from  the  activity  of  the  mind  as  evinced 
in  a  priori  and  determining  judgments)  To  take 
substance*  We  say  that  it  remains  the  same  through- 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          61 

out  all  change.  In  other  words,  this  is  a  synthetic 
a  priori  judgment  which  constitutes  a  condition  of 
our  knowledge  in  perception  of  external  things. 
"  We  speak  of  phenomena  as  coexisting  and  succeed- 
ing each  other.  But  coexistence  and  succession  are 
modes  of  time,  and  are  indistinguishable,  and  indeed 
inconceivable,  except  in  relation  to  the  one  unchang- 
ing and  permanent  time  which  includes  them  both 
in  its  synthesis.  So  phenomena  can  be  conceived 
and  known  as  coexistent  or  successive,  only  as  con- 
tained in  one  sum  total  of  all  phenomena,  which  is 
itself  permanent  and  unchanging."  But  this  im- 
plies that  the  a  priori  synthesis  of  a  permanent  sub- 
stance is  a  condition  of  experience;  it  is  an  analogy 
from  which  we  derive  the  order  of  experience 
itself. 

(4)  Lastly,  the  Principles  of  the  Pure  Under- 
standing which  deal  with  Modality  are  termed  Postu- 
lates of  Empirical  Thought.  They  are  the  a  priori 
syntheses  of  Physical  science  which  have  to  do,  not 
with  the  objects  of  knowledge  usually  termed 
"  matter  collectively,"  but  with  the  mode  or  kind  of 
our  knowledge  of  them.  The  objects  remain  the 
same,  but  we  are  at  liberty  to  vary  the  point  of 
view  from  which  we  regard  them.  The  Postulates 
are  thus  directly  connected  with  the  three  Cate- 
gories of  Possibility,  Actuality,  and  Necessity.  They 
may  be  stated  as  follows  :  First.  Anything  which  is 
consistent  with  the  formal  conditions  of  experience, 
that  is,  with  the  necessary  forms  of  conception  and 
perception,  is  possible.  Second.  Whatever  agrees 
with  the  material  conditions  of  experience,  as  given 


62  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

in  sensation,  is  actual.  Third.  Anything  the  reality 
of  which  follows,"according  to  the  universal  con- 
ditions of  experience,  from  the  reality  of  something 
else  perceived  to  exist  is  necessary. 

•  These,  then,  are  the  synthetic  a  priori  judgments 
to  be  found  in  Physical  science.  They  are  inferred 
directly  from  the  Categories.  For  this  reason  they 
are  not  of  themselves  a  priori,  like  the  general  con- 
ditions of  Space  and  Time,  which  seem  in  some  sense 
to  be  pre-existent  conditions  of  experience,  j  Never- 
theless they  are  a  priori  as  essentially  if  we  regard 
them  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  results  in  which 
they  are  concerned.  For,  equally  with  Space  and 
Time,  'fhey  involved  permanent  self  which  remains 
the  same  throughout  all  change,  and  which  condi- 
tions experience,  because  apart  from  its  constitutive, 
necessary,  and  universal  activity  knowledge  would  be 
entirely  non-existent.  While  there  may  be  a  dif- 
ference between  such  judgments  as  "  Four  times  nine 
are  thirty-six/'  and  "  I  feel  warm/'  it  is  certain 
that,  in  both  cases  equally,  the  statement  would  be 
meaningless  apart  from  that  reference  to  the  unity 
of  self -consciousness  which  cannot  be  a  mere  deriva- 
tive of  sensation,  but  is  nothing  more  and  not! i ing 
less  than  a  result  of  experience  as  interrelated  and 
unified  by  one  abiding  intelligence.  Kant  did  not 
himself  fully  appreciate  the  consequences  of  this 
principle.  He  nevertheless  enunciated  it  with  the 
utmost  decision. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          63 

IV.    TRANSCENDENTAL   DIALECTIC. 

In  the  ^Esthetic  and  Analytic  we  have  learned 
that  synthetic  a  priori  judgments  are  possible  in 
Mathematical  and  Physical  science  respectively;  and 
we  have  seen  what  these  judgments  are.  In  the  Dia- 
lectic Kant  goes  on  to  ask  the  same  question  in 
reference  to  Metaphysical  science.  At  the  very 
outset  he  had  called  attention  to  the  circumstance 
that  this  last  species  of  science  stands  on  a  somewhat 
different  footing  from  the  other  two.  Mathematics 
and  Physics  may  he  termed  positive  sciences;  they 
deal  with  ^real  phenomena  and  theref ore,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,,  they  exist.  But  Metaphysical  science  occu- 
pies a  position  strongly  in  contrast  with  theirs.  It 
is  not  a  dweller  on  earth.,  as  it  were;  for  it  has  no 
dealings  with  the  matter  of  sense.  Its  subject- 
matter  consists,  not  of  phenomena,  but  of  noumena. 
That  is  to  say,  it  considers  ideas  of  reason  as  opposed 
to  affections  in  which  sense  is  present.  Accordingly 
it  cannot  be  said  to  have  any  such  objective  certainty 
as  Physics  or  even  Mathematics.  What,  more  pre- 
cisely, are  its  objects  ?  They  are  mainly  three  in 
number,  and  they  are  "  objects "  of  universal  im- 
port, not  particular,  or  isolated,  phenomena.  The 
Soul  or  Self;  the  World  as  a  whole  or  the  Universe; 
God, — these  constitute  its  proper  field.  From  this 
triple  division  follow  the  three  sections  into  which 
the  inquiry  may  be  separated.  Eational  Psychology 
deals  with  the  Soul;  Rational  Cosmology  with  the 
Universe;  Eational  Theology  with  God.  All  three 
subjects  are  Ideas  of  Reason,  and  as  such  are  to  be 


64  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

set  over  against  the  particular  phenomena  in  which 
a  sense  element  is  necessarily  involved. 

Before  proceeding  to  consider  each  of  these  divi- 
sions in  detail,  it  is  well  to  regard  a  little  more  fully 
the  contrast  between  Mathematical  and  Physical 
science  on  the  one  side,  and  Metaphysics  on  the 
other.  The  former  certainly  do  exist.  The  latter " 
may  not  exist;  in  the  circumstances  of  experience 
it  may  turn  out  to  be  impossible,  and,  as  a  conse- 
quence, the  question  respecting  synthetic  a  priori 
judgments  may  be  insoluble.  Here,  once  more,  an' 
appeal  can  be  taken  to  the  analogy  from  Formal 
Logic.  As  the  earlier  and  less  complex  divisions  of 
this  science  correspond  to  the  ^Esthetic  and  Analytic, 
so  the  final  portion  may  contain  a  parallelism  to- 
Metaphysics,  to  the  Dialectic.  In  the  ^Esthetic  the 
general  forms  of  Space  and  Time  are  also  the  forms 
under  which  the  Simple  Apprehension  of  concepts 
takes  place.  Similarly,  in  the  Analytic,  the  forms  of  • 
Logical  judgment,  the  Categories,  are  the  forms- 
under  which  synthetic  a  priori  judgments  in  Physi-: 
cal  science  fall.  The  forms  incident  to  Logic  and- 
those  incident  to  the  a  priori  judgments  are  identi- 
cal. The  conditions  which  determine  judgments  in 
Mathematics  are  present  also  in  the  Logical  process 
called  Simple  Apprehension;  those  which  determine 
judgments  in  Physical  science  are  to  be  found  in  the 
Logical  process  termed  Judgment.  Pursuing  this 
analogy,  it  is  natural  to  anticipate  that  the  forms  in- 
cident to  the  most  complicated  part  of  Logic,  Eeason- 
ing,  will  also  be  discovered  in  the  Ideas  of  Eeason 
peculiar  to  the  Dialectic.  If  this  be  true,  then  once 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          65 

more,  and  from  a  different  point  of  view,  the  essential 
disparity  between  Physical  and  Mathematical  science 
and  Metaphysics  will  emerge.  Fortunately,  too,  by 
employing  this  analogy  it  becomes  easier  to  detect  the 
great  difference.  It  may  be  best  brought  home  to  us 
by  means  of  an  illustration. 

Suppose  one  declares  that  "  a  circle  is  round,"  both 
Simple  Apprehension  and  Judgment  are  involved. 
For  it  is  impossible  to  characterize  an  object  as  an  ob- 
ject unless  under  the  general  conditions  of  Space  and 
Time.  Moreover,  it  is  impossible  to  characterize  it  as 
of  a  particular  kind  except  by  aid  of  one  of  the  forms 
of  Judgment  called  Categories.  In  other  words,  Mathe- 
matical and  Physical  science,  so  far  as  they  contain 
elements  incident  to  the  Logical  divisions  of  Simple 
Apprehension  and  Judgment,  are  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  the  determination  of  objects  as  such.  Unless 
all  that  this  involves  be  implied,  knowledge  must  re- 
main forever  impossible  ;  the  forms  of  Space  and 
Time  and  the  Categories  are  indispensable  to  even 
the  most  fragmentary  consciousness .  Because  we 
'do  determine  objects  continually,  Mathematical  and 
Physical  science  exist  as  a  matter  of  fact;  they  need 
no  further  proof.  Now  the  case  is  not  the  same  with 
Metaphysics,  because  the  Ideas  of  Eeason  are  not  con- 
ceived as  being  indispensable  in  the  same  way.  Or,  to 
put  the  argument  in  the  language  of  Logic,  Syllogism 
is  not  necessary  to  the  very  being  of  knowledge,  how- 
ever necessary  it  may  be  to  the  unification  of  phe- 
nomena after  they  have  entered  into  the  field  of 
conscious  experience.  When  I  say  that  a  circle  is 
round,  I  merely  refer  this  particular  circle  to  my 


66  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

permanent  self.  I  stand  above  it  and  characterize 
it  as  possessing  such  and  such  a  nature.  But  suppose 
I  next  go  on  to  reason  about  it,  to  find  out  principles 
leading  to  certain  conclusions  in  respect  to  sectors, 
tangents,  and  the  like — I  am  engaged  in  the  process 
of  relating  my  judgment,  that  it  is  a  circle,  to  some- 
thing beyond  this  particular  phenomena,  to  some- 
thing more  far-reaching.  I  am  mounting,  as  it  were, 
to  a  higher  unity.  But  this  higher  unity,  say  that  of 
a  general  mathematical  law,  is  by  no  means  of  such 
certainty  as  the  object  about  which  I  am  reasoning. 
Seasoning  may  impel  me  to  rise  from  the  given  ob- 
ject to  some  large  general  principle — to  the  idea  of  a 
first  cause,  for  example — to  something  on  which  all 
objects  depend  and  to  which  they  must  in  the  last 
resort  be  referred.  But  reasoning  can  never  prove 
this  unity  to  be  of  the  same  obvious  truth  as  the  forms 
of  Space  and  Time  and  the  Categories,  without  whose 
presence  no  object  would  exist  at  all.  TJiese  exist 
and  have  certainty,  because  |  experience  is  an  unde- 
niable fact;]  whereas  the  process  of  superimposing 
results  upon  premises  which  involve  these  forms 
cannot  be  said  to  possess  similarly  obvious  truth,  or 
truth  that  must  be  similarly  regarded  in  every  cal- 
culation. Accordingly,  while  Mathematical  and 
Physical  science  plainly  possess  factual  value,  the 
same  can  never  be  said  of  Metaphysics — at  least  in 
the  first  instance.  It  may  turn  out  to  be  an  impos- 
sibility, or  at  best  a  pseudo-science.  Kant,  starting 
from  these  considerations,  next  goes  on  to  show  why, 
within  the  limits  of  Pure  Reason,  Metaphysical 
science  does  not,  and  cannot,  exist. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.         67 
KATIONAL    PSYCHOLOGY. 

We  have  already  seen,,  in  the  Analytic,  that  all 
knowledge  of  objects  must  be  referred  to  a  Tran- 
scendental Ego,  to  a  permanent  thinking  subject 
which  remains  the  same  through  all  experiential 
.  change.  But  Soul  or  Self  is  no  more  than  another 
name  for  this  Transcendental  Ego.  The  question, 
therefore,  comes  to  be,  How  do  we  obtain  any  knowl- 
edge of  this  entity  viewed  as  an  actual  object  of 
thought  ?  From  what  has  been  said  already,  it  is 
quite  plain  that  any  such  knowledge  can  be  achieved 
in  one  way,  and  in  this  way  alone.  The  affirmation 
that  "I  think  "  is  the  sole  channel  through  which 
knowledge  of  the  soul  as  an  object  of  thought  can  be 
reached.  But  we  naturally  ask,  What  do  "  I  think  " 
concerning  the  Soul  or  Self  ?  Eational  Psychology 
informs  me  that  I  think  of  it  as  a  permanent  entity, 
as  something  that  possesses  unity.  Further,  being 
a  unity,  it  must  so  far  resemble  other  substances  that 
I  may  say  of  it,  "  it  is  indivisible."  But  if  I  so  char- 
acterize the  Soul  I  am  doing  no  more  than  bringing 
it  under  "one  or  other  of  the  forms  of  the  Categories. 
If  it  be  a  unity,  to  take  the  case  on  hand,  it  cannot 
hut^be  judged  such  under  the  category  of  Quantity; 
if  it  be  a  substance,  it  must  be  so  determined  under 
the  category-class  of  Eelation.  And  if  an  object  be 
brought  under  the  Categories  it  is  referred  to  the 
unity  of  the  Transcendental  Ego,  to  the  permanent 
self  which  welds  all  experience  together.  But  Soul 
is  itself  this  Transcendental  Ego.  Consequently, 
when  we  proceed  to  characterize  it  as  an  object  of 


68  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

thought,  we  fall  into  the  absurdity  of  referring  it  to 
itself  for  its  own  explanation. 

Kant  said  that  when  we  attempt  to  think  the  Ego 
as  an  object,  we  find  ourselves  involved  in  a  vicious 
circle;  for  we  must  always  imply  the  idea  of  it  in 
order  to  make  any  judgment  regarding  it.  If,  then, 
the  error  of  assuming  in  the  proof  the  very  thing 
to  be  proved  be  ever  present  here,  two  further  ques- 
tions immediately  arise:  What  is  the  cause  of  this 
mistake  ?  Can  it  be  surmounted  or  removed  ? 
Now,  in  Kant's  view,  the  cause  of  the  error  is  peculiar 
to  Rational  Psychology.  It  centres  in  the  confusion 
of  two  distinct  entities.  In  the  procedure  of 
Rational  Psychology  two  distinct  selves  are  present. 
There  is,  in  the  first  place,  the  Transcendental  Self 
which,  as  has  been  shown,  is  at  the  beginning, 
middle,  and  end  of  all  experience,  unifying  it  and 
rendering  it  possible.  Every  object  that  we  know 
must  be  determined  by  this  Self.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  is  the  self  which  we  are  striving  to  regard  as 
an  object  of  thought.  This  Kant  calls  the  Phe- 
nomenal Self.  It  is  not  to  be  confused  with  that 
other  entity  to  which  we  refer  all  the  objects  of  ex- 
perience. On  the  contrary,  it  turns  out  to  be  an 
object  that  is  subject  to  peculiar  states  of  its  own. 
Each  individual  man  has  states  of  consciousness 
special  to  himself.  These  are  qualities  of  the  Phe- 
nomenal Ego,  and  they  lack  the  permanence  and  the 
transforming  power  typical  of  the  Transcendental 
Ego.  But  in  Rational  Psychology,  as  Kant  explains, 
we  are  continually  confusing  the  two.  Nay,  the  con- 
fusion has  to  be  regarded  as  inevitable,  as  something 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          69 

that  we  cannot  escape.  It  may  be  explained  thus: 
The  Transcendental  Self,  with  its  a  priori  posses- 
sions of  Time  and  Space  and  the  Categories,  cannot 
be  viewed  as  an  individual  object  in  the  same  way  as 
a  saucer  or  a  teaspoon.  It  remains  one  throughout 
all  change.  Its  matter  never  alters.  This  feature 
marks  it  off,  simply  because  it  is  the  condition  of 
the  existence  of  objects  as.  such.  But  the  Phenom- 
enal Self  —  the  self  which  is  a  particular  object 
at  a  particular  time  —  is  such  because  it  is  subject 
to  fleeting  states,  and  so  it  must  be  regarded  as  oc- 
cupying much  the  same  position  as  the  saucer  or  the 
teaspoon.  Yet,  by  an  inevitable  confusion,  we 
transfer  to  mere  passing  states  of  the  Phenomenal 
Self  as  an  object  all  the  permanency  which  charac- 
terizes the  Transcendental  Self  in  its  office  as  the, 
permanent  element  in  experience.  This  confusion 
constitutes  what  Kant  technically  terms  the  Paralo- 
gism of  Eational  Psychology. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  one  cannot  regard  the  Tran- 
scendental Self  as  an  object.  It  is  never  such;  for 
it  is  what  it  is  because  it  must  invariably  be  re- 
garded as  the  Subject — that  by  the  very  existence 
of  which  alone  anything  can  be  said  to  be  an  object. 
But  if  we  say  that  the  Soul  may,  by  means  of  the 
"  inner  sense,"  be  made  an  object  of  knowledge  in 
Eational  Psychology,  we  can  do  so  only  by  declaring 
that,  as  an  object,  it  possesses  certain  qualities,  for  no 
object  could  be  such  unless  it  had  qualities.  So  the 
Paralogism  is  this*:  the  qualities  which  are  abso- 
lutely essential  to  the  determination  of  the  Soul  as 
phenomenal  must  be  derived  from  the  Transcen- 


70  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

dental  Self  with  which  this  new  Phenomenal  Self 
has  literally  nothing  in  common.  The  insoluble 
difficulty  thus  arises.  It  is  impossible  to  determine 
the  Soul,  viewed  as  the  unity  of  self-consciousness, 
by  the  aid  of  any  one  of  the  Categories  or  of  any 
combination  of  them.  For  its  very  nature  centres 
in  the  fact  that  it  furnishes  the  source  whence  the 
Categories  proceed  ;  they  depend  upon  it  for  bare 
existence.  Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  if  Self  be  re- 
garded as  a  phenomenon,  as  one  object  which  exists 
among  others  in  experience,  then  it  becomes  not 
only  possible  but  necessary  to  apply  the  Categories 
to  it.  In  the  case  of  the  Transcendental  Self  this 
a ppli cation  simply  cannot  take  place;  in  the  case 
of  the  Phenomenal  Self  it  may  occur.  And  with 
what  result  ?  The  knowledge  that  we  gain  of  the 
soul  in  Rational  Psychology  by  means  of  applying 
the  Categories  does  not  afford  us  any  information 
whatsoever  about  the  Soul  in  its  most  real  life.  We 
may  know  as  it  seems  at  a  given  moment,  never  as  it 
actually  is.  For  the  essential  point  with  regard  to 
the  Self  is  that  it  is  a  subject,  iiot  an  object.  If, 
then,  we  can  know  it  only  as  an  object,  we  obtain  no 
insight  into  its  real,  or  noumenal,  nature,  and  are 
therefore  as  far  off  as  ever  from  any  explanation  of 
the  synthetic  a  priori  judgments  which  are  possible 
in  this,  the  initial,  portion  of  Metaphysical  science. 
Moreover,  so  long  as  we  remain  within  the  realm  of 
Pure  Eeason  we  cannot  avoid  committing  the  Par- 
alogism, and  are  thus  for  ever  condemned  to  igno- 
rance, or  to  inability  to  solve  the  problem  which 
demands  explanation.  Rationally,  we  must  remain- 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          71 

agnostics  in  regard  to  the  Soul.  Morally,  as  Kant 
was  afterwards  to  show,  we  find  ourselves  in  a  posi- 
tion to  surmount  the  difficulty. 


KATIONAL    COSMOLOGY. 

When  Kant  comes  to  treat  of  the  Universe,  the 
same  difficulty  naturally  occurs:  is  it  any  more  pos- 
sible to  satisfy  the  demands  of  Eeason  for  an  ob- 
jective view  of  the  world  as  a  whole  than  to  present 
it  with  a  phenomenal  knowledge  of  the  Transcen- 
dental Ego  ?  "  Rational  Cosmology  deals  with  the 
idea  of  the  world  as  a  totality  of  phenomena  in  one 
time  and  space.  In  this  world,  as  transcendental 
Logic  has  shown,  every  phenomenon  is  determined 
in  relation  to  other  phenomena.  It  is  determined 
in  time  by  relation  to  preceding  and  coexisting 
phenomena;  in  space  by  relation  to  coexisting  phe- 
nomena; and  except  through  such  relations  it  could 
not  be  determined  as  an  object  at  all.  Yet  such  de- 
termination is  never  complete  and  final ;  for  the 
determining  phenomenon  requires  to  be  determined 
by  another  phenomenon,  and  that  by  another,  and  so 
on  ad  infinitum.  If,  then,  reason  demands  a  com-  , 
plete  and  final  determination  of  objects  in  the  phe-  j 
nomenal  world,  it  demands  something  which,  in  this  ' 
region  of  knowledge  at  least,  can  never  be  attained. 
For  here  every  answer  gives  birth  to  a  new  question, 
and  no  conclusive  answer  can  ever  be  given."  By 
the  very  fact  that  we  are  just  now  discussing  the 
possibility  of  Metaphysic,  it  is  proved  that  reason 
wants  to  unite  every  judgment  that  is  made  with 


72  TEE  CONTENTS  OF 

every  other,  and  so  to  form  a  completed  system  of 
the  universe.  "  Now  the  peculiarity  of  the  problems 
of  reason  which  are  connected  with  this  idea  is  that 
they  immediately  take  the  form  of  dilemmas.  They 
offer  us  the  choice  of  alternatives,  in  one  or  other  of 
which,  according  to  the  law  of  excluded  middle, 
truth  must  lie.  The  f  unconditioned  totality  of  phe- 
nomenal synthesis/  "  that  is,  the  union  of  all  particu- 
lar unities,  or  facts,  in  our  experience  into  one  great 
unity  which  cannot  become  one  object  among  the 
others  that  we  know,  "  must  consist  either  in  a 
finite  or  an  infinite  series,  in  a  series  which  has,  or 
one  which  has  not,  a  beginning.  In  the  former  case 
we  can  reach  totality  only  by  discovering  the  uncon-  . 
ditioned  condition  which  forms  the  first  member  of 
the  series;  in  the  latter  case  we  can  reach  totality 
only  by  summing  up  the  series  of  conditions,  which, 
as  infinite,  is  unconditioned/5  (Caird's  Phil,  of 
Kant,  vol.  ii.  pp.  30-40.)  In  these  circumstances 
reason  finds  that  one  of  two  courses  is  open  to  it — 
either  the  apparently  impossible  task  of  reaching  a 
first  cause  is  set,  or  the  equally  impossible  one  of 
summing  an  infinite  series.  And  this  at  once  leads 
to  the  characteristic  peculiarity  of  Eational  Cos- 
mology. Just  as  the  Paralogism  of  Eational  Psy-  i 
chology  inevitably  results  from  the  attempt  made  \ 
by  reason  to  view  the  Soul  as  an  object  of  knowl- 
edge, so  in  Eational  Cosmology  the  effort  put  forth 
to  grasp  the  world  as  a  whole  gives  rise  to  what  are 
called  Antinomies. 

Before  proceeding  to  discuss  these  in  detail  we 
must  try  to  understand  what  the  term  means.     An 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          73 

antinomy  bears  close  relation  to  what  logicians  call 
a  dilemma.  But  whereas,  in  a  dilemma,  we  are  usu- 
ally presented  with  two  propositions  both  of  which 
are  false,  in  an  antinomy  we  have  two  mutually  ex- 
clusive statements  each  of  which  may  be  true,  because 
it  follows  with  as  much  necessity  from  the  premises 
as  the  other.  The  reason  why  antinomies  thus  arise 
in  Eational  Cosmology  is  this:  It  is  here  supposed 
that  the  reality  of  the  phenomenal  world  which  we 
perceive  around  us  can  be  made  "reality"  in  the 
sense  that  the  world  is  an  abiding  whole — which,  of 
course,  we  can  never  perceive.  In  other  words, 
"reality"  in  its  phenomenal  meaning  and  in  its 
transcendental  import  are  presumed  to  be  capable 
of  application  to  the  universe  in  precisely  the  same 
way.  The  demand  is  that  the  transcendental 
reality  should  appear  in  our  experience  as  if  it  were 
phenomenal.  Out  of  this  unreasonable  requirement 
the  antinomies  arise. 

The  Antinomies. 

The  Antinomies  are  four  in  number,  one  cor- 
responding to  each  of  the  four  great  classes  into 
which  the  Categories  are  divided. 

(1)  The  First  Antinomy,  or  Antinomy  of  Quantity. 
When  we  attempt  to  view  the  world  as  a  whole  as  re- 
gards its  quantity,  two  mutually  exclusive  proposi- 
tions can  at  once  be  proved  with  equal  force.  On  the 
one  hand,  the  world  must  have  had  a  beginning  in 
time,  and  it  must  be  limited  in  space.  On  the  other 
side,  the  world  cannot  have  had  a  beginning  in  time, 


74  TEE  CONTENTS  OF 

and  it  must  be  unlimited  in  space.  If  we  accept  the 
first  of  these  alternatives,  we  must  admit  that  there 
is  something  external  to  the  world  by  which  it  is 
limited.  If,  on  the  contrary,  we  hold  that  the  uni- 
verse, to  be  a  universe,  must  be  unlimited,  then  we 
have  set  out  upon  an  attempt  to  think  the  unthink- 
able. Kant  overcomes  this  dilemma  by  pointing  out 
that  neither  of  the  alternative  propositions  has  any 
meaning  in  the  circumstances.  The  predicates 
"  limited  "  and  "  unlimited  "  can  be  applied  only  to 
things  that  fall  within  our  phenomenal  experience. 
.  Consequently,  to  try  to  fix  them  upon  such  a  nou- 
menon,  or  idea  of  reason,  as  the  world  in  its  entirety 
is  to  lift  them  up'frraTsphere  where  they  lose  all  im- 
port, because  they  become  inapplicable.  Accord- 
ingly, neither  of  the  propositions  can  be  regarded  as 
true,  because  neither  is  false;  they  merely  lack  all 
characteristics  whatsoever,  and  so  do  not  help  us 
one  whit  to  solve  the  problem  on  hand.  In  other 
words,  we  must  conceive  of  the  matter  in  this  way, 
but  in  so  doing  we  only  contradict  ourselves.  So  far 
as  the  quantity  of  the  universe  is  concerned,  Pure 
Eeason  can  furnish  us  with  no  information. 

(2)  The  Antinomy  of  Quality.  Here,  as  before, 
two  propositions  result  from  any  effort  to  grasp  the 
quality  of  the  universe.  First.  "  Every  composite 
substance  in  the  world  is  made  up  of  simple  parts, 
and  nothing  exists  which  is  not  either  itself  simple 
or  made  up  of  simple  parts/*-  Second.  "No  com- 
posite thing  consists  of  simple  parts,  and  there  does 
not  exist  in  the  world  any  simple  substance." 
Briefly,  the  two  competing  conclusions  are:  every- 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          75 

thing  is  simple,  and  nothing  is  simple.  When  we 
cut  a  piece  of  wood  in  halves  we  divide  it  into 
simple  parts.  And  it  is  quite  clear  that,  from  the 
nature  of  the  case,  every  substance  is  capable  of 
being  divided  in  this  way.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
half  of  the  original  piece  of  wood  is  also  divisible, 
and  its  halves  divisible  again,  and  so  on,  till  at  last 
a  portion  is  reached  so  minute  that  it  cannot  be 
further  subdivided ;  therefore  the  substance  is 
incapable  of  division.  As  in  the  last  case,  Kant 
points  out  that  neither  of  the  propositions  has  any 
meaning.  As  before,  we  are  applying  to  the  nou- 
menon,  or  idea  of  reason,  standards  which  can  be  of 
effect  only  in  relation  to  the  phenomenon  founded 
on  sense  material.  These  conclusions  are  our  sole 
resources  in  face  of  the  problem  ,  but  they  tell  us 
nothing.  Once  more  the  demands  of  Eeason  meet 
with  complete  disappointment. 

(3)  The  Antinomy  of  Relation.  Here  we  are  on 
somewhat  different  ground.  The  foregoing  anti- 
nomies may  be  termed  mathematical  —  they  deal 
with  dead  things;  but  here  we  come  to  consider 
the  organic.  This  antinomy  chiefly  concerns 
casual  relation.  In  other  words,  it  faces  the 
problem  of  the  possibility  of  a  first  or  free  cause. 
Its  thesis  is  as  follows:  "  Causality  according  to  the 
laws  of  nature  is  not  the  sole  causality  from  which 
the  phenomena  of  the  world  as  a  whole  are  dedu- 
cible,  but  it  is  necessary  for  their  explanation  to 
assume  also  a  causality  by  freedom."  To  this  the 
antithesis  immediately  suggests  itself:  "  There  is  no 
such  thing  as  freedom,  but  everything  happens 


76  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

purely  according  to  the  laws  of  nature."  To  prove 
the  former,  it  is  needful  to  remember  that  every 
effect  must  have  a  cause.  But  this  cause  of  change 
is  itself  a  change  or  effect,  and  so  we  are  compelled 
to  pass  from  it  to  the  cause  whence  it  proceeded,  and 
from  this  once  more  to  a  third  cause,  and  so  on  for 
ever.  The  permanent  or  unchanging  cannot  possi- 
bly be  the  cause  of  anything;  for,  if  the  cause  do  not 
move,  it  is  unable  to  move  the  effect.  Conse- 
quently we  are  unable  to  present  causality  to  our- 
selves except  as  a  series  of  changes.  But  because 
very  change  must  be  referable  to  a  prior  change, 
called  its  cause,  so  the  entire  series  of  causes  and 
effects  must  also  have  a  cause;  and  so  there  cannot 
but  be  a  First  Cause,  which  is  what  it  is,  because  it 
is  itself  uncaused  or  free.  But  immediately  we  ar- 
rive at  this  conclusion  the  antithesis  comes  out  to 
contradict  us.  For  if  the  First  Cause  be  in  any  true, 
or  knowable,  sense  a  cause,  it  must  go  forth  from 
itself  into  its  immediate  effect.  For  this  reason  it 
is  a  change,  not  a  permanent  thing.  Hence,  accord- 
ing to  the  universal  law  of  causality,  it  too  cannot 
help  being  an  effect.  Therefore  there  cannot  be 
any  first  cause.  Here,  as  formerly,  Kant  shows  that 
we  are  applying  categories  of  the  phenomenal  to  the 
transcendental;  we  are  trying  to  bring  the  uncon- 
ditioned in  so  as  to  make  it  bow  to  the  terms  of  the 
conditioned.  The  statements  that  there  may  be 
uncaused  beginnings  of  series  of  effects,  and  that 
every  effect  must  have  a  cause,  hold  good  only  in 
reference  to  the  phenomenarworld  of  sense.  When 
lifted  up  to  the  sphere  of  the  noumenal  they  lose  all 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          77 

value.     The  universe  as  a  whole  is  not  a  " thing" 
to  which  causality  applies.     Again  Eeason  is  balked. 

(4)  The  Antinomy  of  Modality.     This  antinomy^ 
concerns  the  kind  or  ultimate  nature  of  the  universe./ 
The  thesis  is:  There  belongs  to  the  universe  (either 
as  part  or  as  cause)  an  absolutely  necessary  being. 
fFrom  this  the  antithesis  at  once  flows:  There  is  no 
necessary  being  either  in  the  world  or  out  of  ily   The 
considerations   whereby   these   two   conclusions   are 
supported  are  in  principle  the  same  as  in  the  fore- 
going case.     And,  as  in  the  other  antinomies,  Kant  I  y 
shows  that  the  whole  situation  lacks  meaning.     No  J 
information  regarding  the  kind  of  world  as  a  whole 
is  obtainable  by  Eeason.     For  Eeason  knows  nothing 
but  the  phenomenal.     It  is  equipped  solely  for  the 
purpose  of  cognizing  the  phenomenal.     Thus  whetf  jL^K? 
it  approaches  the  noumenal  it  does  no  more  thaip. 
treat  it  as  if  it  were  phenomenal,,  and  consequently 
misses  its  essential  nature  completely. 

Before  quitting  the  Antinomies  it  is  well  to  note 
that  from  one  point  of  view  the  third  and  fourth  are 
much  more  important  than  the  first  and  second. 
Take  the  first,  for  example.  In  this  case,  where  we 
have  to  consider  either  a  limited  or  an  unlimited 
universe,  we  are  bound  to  suppose  that,  whichever 
alternative  we  choose  to  adopt,  the  world  under  in- 
spection is  homogeneous.  That  is  to  say,  omitting 
the  attribute  of  limitation,  the  infinite  world  is  to  be 
viewed  as  of  precisely  the  same  nature  as  the  finite. 
And  in  the  second  antinomy  the  same  may  be  predi- 
cated. But  when  we  come  to  the  third  the  situa- 
tion is  entirely  different.  The  free  cause  of  the 


78  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

thesis  may  be  quite  heterogeneous  from  the  natural 
cause  or  necessitated  change  of  the  antithesis. 
"  The  elements  related  as  cause  and  effect,  necessary 
and  contingent,  need  not,  so  far  as  they  are  deter- 
mined by  these  categories,  have  any  similarity. 
Hence,  when  we  pass  by  the  aid  of  these  categories 
from  the  conditioned  to  the  unconditioned,  we  do  not 
necessarily  regard  the  former  as  in  any  way  like  the 
latter."  The  same  holds  true  of  the  fourth  anti- 
nomy. Now  an  inference  of  great  importance  may 
be  drawn  from  this  consideration.  We  may  find 
ourselves  able  to  say,  not,  as  in  the  case  of  the  first 
\  and  second  antinomies,  that  both  thesis  and  anti- 
^  thesis  are  unmeaning;  but,  in  the  case  of  the  third 
/  and  fourth,  that  both  propositions  are  true,  though 
their  truth  possesses  application  in  different  spheres. 
Take  the  conception  of  a  first  cause,  for  instance. 
We  may  hold  that  there  must  be  such  a  cause. 
Now  if  we  regard  it  as  in  all  respects  like  the  cause 
that  we  meet  with  in  the  course  of  phenomenal  ex- 
perience, we  must  unquestionably  admit  that  it 
moves  out  of  itself  in  order  to  give  rise  to  an  effect. 
In  other  words,  we  are  driven  to  acknowledge  that 
it  is  itself  no  more  than  a  change;  and  this  done, 
we  must  immediately  set  out  in  quest  of  its  cause. 
But  introducing  the  implication  of  heterogeneity, 
we  at  once  come  to  see  that  there  is  no  incontro- 
vertible reason  why  we  should  thus  regard  the  so- 
called  first  cause.  By  a  process  of  reasoning  we  may 
bring  ourselves  to  it,  and  then  rest  satisfied  with  our 
achievement.  That  is,  it  may  be  sufficient  to  gain 
the  conviction  that  a  first  cause  is,  and  superflu- 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          ?9 

ous  to  proceed  to  any  detailed  characterization  of 
its  nature.  Eegarding  the  question  thus,  there  is 
no  reason  why  the  first  cause  must  be  viewed  as 
identical  in  kind  with  the  causes  familiar  in 
a  posteriori  experience.  These  causes  undoubtedly 
bear  rule  in  the  empirical  world;  they  determine 
the  relations  of  phenomena  to  one  another.  There 
is  110  place  for  a  first  cause  among  them.  Neverthe- 
less the  relation  of  the  empirical  world  to  the  nou- 
menal  world  may  be  ruled  by  a  cause  of  the  nature 
of  the  first  cause  here  spoken  of.  Accordingly,  if 
it  is  possible  to  show,  say  on  moral  grounds,  that 
there  is  a  noumenal  world,  which  is  just  as  real  as 
the  phenomenal  sphere  that  experience  has  rendered 
familiar,  we  may  at  once  rise  to  the  conception  of  a 
perfectly  free  being  as  legitimately  attaching  to  this 
new  sphere.  Kant  here  leaves  himself  a  loophole 
of  escape  from  the  agnostic  conclusions  of  the 
"  Critique  of  Pure  Reason."  In  the  moral  world 
man  may  be  the  denizen  of  another  universe  in  which 
the  conceptions  here  denied  reality  are  the  founda- 
tion facts. 

RATIONAL    THEOLOGY. 

Rational  Theology  has  for  its  main  subject-matter 
proof  of  the  thesis  that  God  exists.  So  the  question 
comes  to  be:  What  value  can  be  attached,  from  the 
standpoint  of  Pure  Reason,  to  the  proofs  usually  ad- 
vanced in  support  of  this  contention  ?  These  argu- 
ments may  be  summarized  as  three  in  number:  First, 
the  Ontological  proof ;  second,  the  Cosmological 


80  THE  CONTENTS  0? 

proof ;  third,  the  Physico-theological  proof,  other- 
wise known  as  the  teleological  proof  or  argument 
from  Design. 

(1)  The  Ontological  Argument.  This  argument 
is  essentially  deductive  in  nature.  Given  a  certain 
fact,  it  proceeds  to  infer  another  from  it.  The 
method  pursued,  then,  is  that  of  deducing  the  fact  of 
God's  being  from  the  a  priori  idea  of  him.  If  man 
finds  that  the  idea  of  God  is  necessarily  involved  in 
his  self -consciousness,  it  is  legitimate  for  him  to  pro- 
ceed from  this  notion  to  the  actual  existence  of  the 
divine  being.  In  other  words,  the  idea  of  God  neces- 
sarily includes  existence.  It  may  include  it  in  sev- 
eral ways.  One  may  argue,  for  instance,  according 
to  the  method  of  Descartes,  and  say  that  the  concep- 
tion of  God  could  have  originated  only  with  the 
divine  being  himself,  therefore  the  idea  possessed 
by  us  is  based  on  the  prior  existence  of  God  himself. 
Or  we  may  allege  that  we  have  the  idea  that  God  is 
the  most  necessary  of  all  beings — that  is  to  say,  he 
belongs  to  the  class  of  realities  ;  consequently  it 
cannot  but  be  a  fact  that  he  exists.  This  is  held  to 
be  proof  per  saltum.  A  leap  takes  place  from  the 
premise  to  the  conclusion,  and  all  intermediate  steps 
are  omitted.  The  implication  is  that  premise  and 
conclusion  stand  over  against  one  another  without 
any  obvious,  much  less  necessary,  connection.  A 
jump  is  made  from  thought  to  reality.  Kant  here 
objects  that  being  or  existence  is  not  a  mere  attribute 
which  may  be  added  on  to  a  subject,  thereby  increas- 
ing its  qualitative  content.  The  predicate,  being, 
adds  something  to  the  subject  which  no  mere  quality 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.         81 

can  give.  It  informs  us  that  the  idea  is  not  a  mere 
conception,  but  is  also  an  actually  existing  reality. 
Being,  as  Kant  thinks,  actually  increases  the  con- 
cept itself  in  such  a  way  as  to  transform  it.  You 
may  attach  as  many  attributes  as  you  please  to  a  con- 
cept; you  do  not  thereby  lift  it  out  of  the  subjective  • 
sphere  and  render  it  actual.  So  you  may  pile  at- 
tribute upon  attribute  on  the  conception  of  God, 
but  at  the  end  of  the  process  you  are  not  necessarily 
one  step  nearer  his  real  existence.  So  that  when 
we  say  "  God  exists,"  we  do  not  simply  attach  a  new 
attribute  to  our  conception;  we  do  far  more  than 
this  implies.  We  pass  our  bare  concept  from  the 
sphere  of  inner  subjectivity  to  that  of  outer  reality.  • 
This  is  the  great  vice  of  the  Ontological  argument. 
The  idea  of  ten  dollars  is  different  from  the  fact  only 
in  reality.  In  the  same  way  the  conception  of  God 
is  different  from  the  fact  of  his  existence  only  in 
reality.  When,  accordingly,  the  Ontological  proof 
declares  that  the  latter  is  involved  in  the  former, 
it  puts  forward  nothing  more  than  a  mere  statement. 
ISTo  proof  is  forthcoming  precisely  where  proof  is 
most  required.  We  are  not  in  a  position  to  say  that 
the  idea  of  God  includes  existence,  because  it  is  of 
the  very  nature  of  ideas  not  to  include  existence. 

(2)  The  Cosmological  Argument  may  be  stated  as 
follows:  "  Contingent  things  exist — at  least  I  exist; 
and  as  they  are  not  self-caused,  nor  capable  of  ex- 
planation as  an  infinite  series,  it  is  requisite  to  infer 
that  a  necessary  being,  on  whom  they  depend,  ex- 
ists." Seeing  that  this  being  exists,  he  belongs  to 
the  realm  of  reality.  Seeing  that  all  things  issue 


82  THE  CONTENTS  OF 

from  him,  he  is  the  most  necessary  of  beings,  for  only 
a  being  who  is  self-dependent,  who  possesses  all  the 
conditions  of  reality  within  himself,  could  be  the 
origin  of  contingent  things.     And  such  a  being  is 
God.     This  proof  is  invalid  for  three  chief  reasons. 
First,  it  makes  use  of  a  category,  namely,  Cause. 
And,  as  has  been  already  pointed  out,  it  is  not  pos- 
sible to  apply  this,  or  any  other,  category  except  to 
the  matter  given  by  sense  under  the  general  con- 
ditions of  space  and  time.     If,  then,  we  employ  it 
in  relation  to  Deity,  we  try  to  force  its  application 
in  a  sphere  where  it  is  useless,  and  incapable  of  af- 
fording any  information.     Once  more,  we  are  in  the 
now  familiar  difficulty   of  the   paralogism   of   Ra- 
tional   Psychology    or    of    the    Antinomies.      The 
category  has  meaning  only  when  applied  to  phe- 
nomena.      But     God    is    a    noumenon.       Second, 
it  mistakes  an  idea  of  absolute  necessity — an  idea 
which  is  nothing  more  than  an  ideal — for  a  synthe- 
sis of  elements  in  the  phenomenal  world  or  world  of 
experience.     This  necessity  is  not  an  object  of  knowl- 
edge, derived  from  sensation  and  set  in  shape  by  the 
operation  of  categories.     It  cannot  be  regarded  as 
more  than  an  inference.     Yet  the  cosmological  ar- 
gument treats  it  as  if  it  were  an  object  of  knowledge 
exactly  on  the  same  level  as  perception  of  any  thing 
or  object  in  the  course  of  experience.     Thirdly,  it 
presupposes    the     Ontological     argument,     already 
proved  false.     It  does  this,  because  it  proceeds  from 
the  conception  of  the  necessity  of  a  certain  being  to 
the  fact  of  his  existence.     And  it  is  possible  to  take 
this  course  only  if  idea  and  fact  are  convertible  with 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.          83 

one  another.     It  has  just  been  proved  that  they  are 
not  so  convertible. 

(3)  Thirdly,  there  is  the  Physico-theological  Proof, 
popularly  known  as  the  argument  from  Design,  the 
most  widely  accepted,  yet  the  most  faulty,  of  all. 
This  argument  concludes  from  the  order  and  adapta- 
tion in  nature  to  the  absolute  wisdom  and  power  of 
its  designer,  just  as  one  might  argue  from  inspection 
of  a  machine  to  the  skill  and  artifice  of  its  construc- 
tor. This  argument  has  also  several  weaknesses. 
If  it  were  to  lead  to  a  God,  it  would  only  supply  the 
idea  of  an  architect,  not  of  a  creator.  A  creator 
makes  his  own  materials,  an  architect  is  presented 
with  his.  The  God  of  the  argument  from  design 
would  be  a  workman  who  had  done  his  best  with 
foreign  matter,  with  matter  which  constantly 
thwarted  his  purpose;  he  would  not  be  God  in  any 
full  sense  of  this  term.  A  God  limited  by  mat- 
ter is  no  God.  From  this  another  objection  immedi- 
ately follows.  We  arrive  at  the  conception  only  of  a 
very  great  being,  one  of  much  power,  of  peculiar 
wisdom.  We  do  not  achieve  one  in  whom  we  live 
and  move  and  have  our  being.  The  fac^  that  the 
world  is  contingent  leads  us  to  the  notion  of  a 
being  who  gives  it  form,  and  who  is  therefore  not 
absolute.  Now  it  may  very  well  be  asked  :  Can 
these  defects  of  this  proof  be  removed  ?  Kant  thinks 
that  they  can.  They  may  be  surmounted  by  proving 
that  God  is  the  cause  of  the  world  as  well  as  its  archi- 
tect; and  secondly,  by  showing  that  he  is,  not  simply 
a  very  great  being,  but  also  one  who  is  absolutely 
necessary.  But  in  order  to  effect  this  improvement, 


84  TUE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON. 

the  two  other  proofs  must  be  requisitioned — the 
Cosmological  to  prove  that  God  is  the  most  necessary 
being,  the  Ontological,  on  which  the  Cosmological 
depends.  Thus  all  the  proofs  are  equally  valueless, 
and  in  relation  to  the  third  idea  of  reason,  as  in 
relation  to  the  others,  Pure  Reason  can  accomplish 
nothing  in  the  way  of  satisfying  its  own  demands. 

For  the  purposes  of  the  beginner,  this  may  be 
taken  as  the  close  of  the  "  Critique  of  Pure  Reason." 
For  the  Transcendental  Theory  of  Method  is  an  ab- 
stract discussion  of  principles  presupposed  in  what 
has  been  discussed  already.  Its  general  importance 
lies  in  the  emphasis  which  it  lays  upon  the  im- 
portance of  "  criticism  "  as  opposed  to  other  philo- 
sophical methods  illustrated  in  previous  history. 

The  "  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  "  vindicates  Space 
and  Time  as  the  a  priori  forms  of  synthesis  found 
in  Mathematics.  It  vindicates  the  Categories  as  the 
forms  of  a  priori  s}^nthetic  judgment  found  in  the 
particular  relations  of  objects  discussed  by  the 
Physical  sciences.  P>ut  it  completely  fails  to  vindi- 
cate Metaphysics.  So  far  as  the  conclusions  reached 
prove  anything,  they  tend  to  show  that  there  is  no 
subject-matter  for  Metaphysics  to  work  up  into 
scientific  form.  Here  agnosticism  is  the  last  word. 

But  the  Ideas  of  Reason  which  it  is  impossible  to 
base  firmly  in  the  sphere  of  Pure  Reason  are  after- 
wards vindicated  in  the  realm  of  morals.  It  may 
therefore  be  advisable  to  make  a  brief  statement,  in 
concluding,  as  to  the  relations  of  Kant's  three  great 
"  Critiques  "—the  "Pure  Reason,"  the  "Practical 
Reason,"  and  "  Judgment." 


CONCLUSION'. 

LIKE  all  Kant's  work,  this  triple  division  of  his 
criticism  is  traceable  to  an  analytic  of  facts  given  in 
experience.  According  to  the  method  of  traditional 
Psychology,  he  divides  the  Self  into  three  distinct 
parts,  powers,  or  faculties.  These  are  Intellect,  Will, 
and  Feeling.  The  intellectual  or  cognitive  faculty 
is  that  power  which  presents  facts  or  phenomena  of 
sense  to  the  thinker.  These,  as  the  "  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason"  is  intended  to  prove,  are  in  some 
measure  subject  to  the  laws  of  intelligence.  The 
general  conditions  of  their  appearance,  their  particu- 
lar relations  to  one  another,  are  determined  by  an 
a  priori,  or  mind-conditioned,  element.  But  as  par- 
ticular things  they  are  what  they  are  because  of  the 
matter  of  sense  incident  to  them;  over  this  the  intel- 
lectual faculty  has  no  power.  So  far  as  intellect  is 
concerned,  matter  is  without  law.  Hence  the  impos- 
sibility of  vindicating  Ideas  of  Reason,  which  extend 
to  the  universe  as  a  whole,  from  the  point  of  disad- 
vantage incident  to  pure  intellect. 

The  will,  however,  is  that  faculty  whereby  self- 
consciousness  imposes  its  own  law  upon  the  material 
world.  It  thus  transforms  what  was  once  foreign 
and  lawless  and  irrational  into  a  neighborly,  orderly, 

85 


86  CONCLUSION. 

and  morally  conditioned  whole.  Hence  within  the 
sphere  of  the  moral  or  Practical  Keason  it  is  possible 
to  vindicate  the  demands  of  reason  for  the  Soul  and 
immortality,  for  the  universe  as  an  orderly  whole 
and  freedom,  and,  to  crown  all,  for  God. 

Feeling  is  a  faculty  closely  associated  with  aesthetic 
capacity.  It  may  accordingly  be  called  the  faculty 
of  Taste  or  Judgment.  In  its  very  nature  it  stands 
midway  between  the  purely  intellectual  and  the 
purely  moral.  Like  intellect,  it  receives  its  matter 
from  sense  in  the  course  of  experience,  and  this 
without  being  able  to  alter  it  so  as  to  force  it  to  sub- 
serve its  peculiar  purposes.  But,  after  the  manner 
of  Practical  Eeason,  it  gives  a  law  to  this  matter.  Yet 
its  law  is  not  imposed,  as  is  the  moral  imperative. 
It  rather  reads  out  what  is  in  matter,  discovers  filia- 
tions not  otherwise  noted,  perceives  relations  not 
grasped  without  its  aid.  For  instance,  it  finds  that 
beauty  and  design  are  implied  in  the  world  of  sense 
phenomena;  in  other  words,  it  consciously  interprets 
a  law  that  is  unconsciously  expressed.  This  the 
faculty  of  Pure  Eeason,  strange  to  say,  cannot  do* 
Accordingly  this  power  of  Judgment  is  well  fitted  to 
mend  the  broken  universe  by  interposing  between 
the  world  of  intellect  and  that  of  sense.  Thus  the 
"  Critique  of  Judgment "  is  devoted  to  an  exposition 
of  the  faculty  for  design,  by  which  the  feeling  ele- 
ment in  self -consciousness  is  preeminently  character- 
ized. 


BOOKS. 

FOR  those  who  have  no  teacher  at  hand  to  consult, 
the  following  suggestions  may  possibly  be  useful. 
They  are  not  meant  to  exhaust  even  the  leading  works 
which  the  real  student  of  Kant  ought  certainly  to 
master  ;  they  may  serve,  however,  to  guide  begin- 
ners. 

(1)  Texts.     The  classical  editions  of  Kant's  works 
are  those  of  Eosenkranz  and  Schubert  (12  vols.,1838- 
42);  of  Hartenstein  (second  edition  in  8  vols.,  1867- 
69)  ;   of   Kirchmann    (8    vols.,    1868).     Kehrbach's 
editions  of  the  three  "  Critiques  "  singly,  and  Erd- 
mann's  edition  of  the  "  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft," 
are  useful. 

(2)  Translations.     The   translation   by   Professor 
Max  Miiller  is  the  best  (second  edition  in  one  volume; 
Macmillan  &   Co.,  London  and  New  York,   1896; 
price   $3).     The   usefulness    of   this   translation   is 
greatly  enhanced  by  addition  of  the  changes  intro- 
duced by  Kant  into  the  second  edition  of  his  great 
work — changes   which   have   occasioned  much   dis- 
cussion.   Eeferences  to  the  pages  of  the  German  text 
are  also  given.     The  "  Prolegomena  to  every  future 
System  of  Metaphysics  "  may  be  read  either  in  the 
translation  of  Prof.  Mahaffy  (Macmillan)  or  of  Mr. 
E.  B.  Bax  (G-.  Bell,  London;  Macmillan,  New  York). 

87 


88  BOOKS. 

(3)  Aids.  The  best  work  on  Kant  in  English  is 
Edward  Caird's  "  Critical  Philosophy  of  Immanuel 
Kant"  (2  vols.;  Macmillan  &  Co.,  New  York,  and 
Maclehose,  Glasgow,  1889).  Morris'  Exposition  of 
the  "Critique  of  Pure  Keason"  (Griggs  &  Co., 
Chicago,  1882),  Wallace's  "Kant"  in  Blackwood's 
series  of  Philosophical  Classics  (1882),  and  Watson's 
"  Selections  from  Kant "  (Henry  Holt  &  Co.,  1888) 
are  exceedingly  useful.  Adamson's  Lectures  "  On 
the  Philosophy  of  Kant "  furnish  admirable  supple- 
mentary expositions  of  certain  points,  and  contain 
exceedingly  pertinent  notes  (Edinburgh,  1879).  The 
German  literature  on  Kant  is  enormous;  references 
to  it  may  be  found  in  Ueberweg's  "  History  of 
Philosophy,"  vol.  ii.,  and,  less  fully,  in  such  histories 
as  those  of  Erdmann,  Burt,  Falckenberg,  and  Windel- 
band. 


SOME  TEEMS  A1STD  DETAILS  SUPPLEMENT- 
ING THE  TEXT. 

A  priori.  This  means  with  Kant  what  is  univer- 
sally present  in  experience  and  necessary  to  its  very 
existence;  i.e.,,  constitutive  principles  which  are  not 
learned  in  the  course  oTexperience,  But  are  involved 
in  the  very  fact  of  the  existence  of  knowledge.  Kant 
often  speaks  as  if  the  a  priori  elements  could  be 
known  apart  from  experience.  The  spirit  of  his 
teaching,  however,  is  that  they  form  part  of  experi- 
ence as  an  organism,  and  therefore  cannot  be  known 
until  we  have  become  aware  of  them  in  the  course  of 
experience  is  actually  .ours. 

A  posteriori.  This  means  with  Kant  what  is  con- 
tingent in  experience,  what  is  learned  as  experience 
proceeds  on  its  course.  A  posteriori  facts  may  or 
may  not  occur  in  experience,  and  so  no  one  of  them 
is  to  be  taken  as  in  any  sense  indispensable  to  the  ex- 
istence of  knowledge.  Some,  however, — though  not 
necessarily  this  one  or  that  one, — are  always  present, 
otherwise  the  a  priori  factors  would  not  be  brought 
into  clear  consciousness. 

Berkeley,  George;  b.  1685,  d.  1753.  His  most  im- 
portant work  for  the  pre-Kantian  development  is 
"The  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge"  (1709). 


90  TERMS. 

See  Prof.  Eraser's  "  Selections  from  Berkeley,"  and 
his  edition  of  Berkeley's  "  Works." 

Category  is  that  which  can  be  referred  to,  or  enter 
into,  a  relation.  Kant  employs  the  term  to  designate 
original  relations  without  which  knowledge  of  par- 
ticular objects  would  not  be  possible;  e.g.,  the  rela- 
tion of  cause  and  effect,  of  substance  and  attribute. 
This  relation  is  referred  to  the  synthetic  action  of 
Keason. 

Dualism  is  the  name  given  to  those  metaphysical 
theories  which  imply  that  matter  in  space  exists  as 
an  object  out  of  all  relation  to  a  thinking  subject. 

Empiricism  is  the  name  given  to  those  philo- 
sophical theories  which  teach  that  human  knowl- 
edge is  entirely,  or  mainly,  acquired  in  the  course  of 
life,  and  this  by  the  action  upon  man  through  sensa- 
tion of  something  external  to  his  knowledge  and 
differing  from  it.  Empiricism  is  commonly  based  on 
Dualism. 

Experience  in  its  philosophical  significance — which 
it  has  acquired  chiefly  in  the  Kantian  school — means 
the  sum  total  of  human  knowledge,  a  total  in  which 
sense  and  constitutive  principles  of  mind  are  organi- 
'cally  interconnected  and  cannot  be  conceived  of  in 
their  separation  from  one  another.  Otherwise  the 
term  is  employed  to  mean  what  man  gradually 
learns  in  the  course  of  life.  Kant  uses  the  term  in 
both  senses;  as  a  rule,  it  is  not  difficult  to  determine 
its  meaning  from  the  context,  although,  as  Vaihinger 
points  out,  there  are  exceptions. 

Hume,  David;  b.  1711,  d.  1776.  His  most  im- 
portant work  for  the  pre-Kantian  development  is 


TERMS.  91 

his  "Enquiry  concerning  Human  Understanding" 
(1748;  German  translation,  1765);  his  chief  works 
are  :  "  A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  being  an 
Attempt  to  Introduce  the  Experimental  Method  of 
Reasoning  into  Moral  Subjects"  (1739-40);  "Essays: 
Moral,  Political,  Literary"  (1742);  "Enquiry  con- 
cerning the  Principles  of  Morals  "  (1751)  ;  "  The 
Natural  History  of  Religion"  (1757).  The  two 
"  Enquiries "  are  revisions  respectively  of  Books  I 
and  III  of  the  "Treatise."  For  the  "Treatise" 
and  "  Essays  "  see  the  edition  of  Green  and  Grose. 

Imagination  with  Kant  is  the  third  "  faculty," 
which  mediates  between  those  of  Sense  and  Reason. 
It  faces  both  ways.  On  the  one  side,  like  Sense,  it 
is  perceptive;  on  the  other,  like  Reason,  it  appre- 
hends under  a  priori  forms.  Like  Sense,  it  is  re- 
ceptive and  passive;  like  Reason,  it  is  active  and  con- 
stitutive. From  the  standpoint  of  modern  Psy- 
chology this  part  of  his  doctrine  is  open  to  very 
serious  criticism.  See  Caird,  vol.  i.  pp.  311,  327, 
353,  390,  431,  sq. 

Intuition  with  Kant  commonly  means  "  judgment 
of  perception."  That  is,  it  relates  to  a  judgment 
good  only  for  the  person  who  makes  it,  and  having 
reference  only  to  a  definite  fact  or  phenomenon  now 
present  in  consciousness.  See  "  Prolegomena," 
sec.  18. 

Kant,  Immanuel;  b.  1724,  d.  1804.  (1)  His  prin- 
cipal pre-critical  works  are:  "Universal  History  of 
Nature  and  Theory  of  the  Heavens"  (1755);  "Physi- 
cal Monadology"  (1756).  The  following  are  spe- 
cially important,  as  bearing  on  his  break  with 


92  TERMS. 

Wolffianism  :  "  The  False  Subtilty  of  the  four 
Syllogistic  Figures ";  "  The  only  possible  Proof  of 
the  Existence  of  God  ";  "  On  the  Evidence  of  the 
Principles  of  Natural  Theology  and  Morals  ";  "  At- 
tempt to  introduce  the  Conception  of  Negative 
Quantity  into  Philosophy"  (1761-2);  "Dreams  of  a 
Spirit-Seer  illustrated  by  the  Dreams  of  Meta- 
physics" (1766);  "On  the  Eational  Basis  for  Dis- 
tinction of  Eegions  in  Space"  (1768);  "Dissertation 
on  the  Form  and  Principles  of  the  Sensible  and  In- 
telligible World"  (1770).  See  Caird,  vol.  i.  (2) 
Works  of  the  critical  period  :  "  Critique  of  Pure 
Eeason"  (1781);  "Prolegomena  to  every  future 
Metaphysic "  (1783)  ;  "  Foundation  of  the  Meta- 
physic  of  Ethics"  (1785);  "Metaphysical  Principles 
of  Natural  Science "  (1787)  ;  "  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason"  (second  edition,  1788);  "Critique  of 
Practical  Reason  "  (1788);  "  Critique  of  Judgment  " 
(1793)  ;  "  Religion  within  the  Limits  of  Mere 
Reason"  (1793);  "Metaphysic  of  Ethics"  (1797). 
See  Caird,  vol.  ii. 

Leibniz,  Gottfried  Wilhelm;  b.  1646,  d.  1716.  The 
most  important  works  for  the  pre-Kantian  develop- 
ment are  the  "  New  System  of  Nature "  (1695)  ; 
"Theodicy"  (1710);  "Monadology"  (1714).  See 
the  "  Philosophical  Works  of  Leibnitz,"  by  George 
Mark  Duncan;  Caird,  vol.  i.,  chap.  iii. 

Locke,  John;  b.  1632,  d.  1704.  Principal  work  for 
the  pre-Kantian  development,  "  Essay  concerning 
Human  Understanding"  (1690).  See  Campbell 
Eraser's  Edition  with  Introduction  and  Notes. 


TERMS.  93 

Monad.  This  is  the  name  given  by  Leibniz  to 
the  ultimate  elements  of  being — those  which  cannot 
be  analyzed  into  anything  more  fundamental.  He 
conceives  of  the  Monad  as  spiritual,  simple,  self- 
determining,  immaterial,  self-contained,  and  active. 
It  derives  its  characteristics  from  the  fact  that  it  is 
an  active  unity. 

Noumenon.  It  may  be  said  generally,  that  by  this 
term  Kant  means  an  object  of  Keason,  in  contradis- 
tinction to  phenomenon,  an  object  of  sense.  If 
Eeason  be  forced  to  infer  that,  throughout  all  ex- 
perience, one  _sel£t  remains  unchanged  and  operates 
as  a  principle  uniting  the  whole,  then  this  self,  not 
being  an  object  presented  by  any  sensible  experience, 
but  being  an  inference  of  Eeason,  is  to  be  called  a 
Noumenon.  In  the  same  way,  if  Keason  obtains 
from  sense  the  matter  on  which  it  superimposes  the 
Categories,  and  at  the  same  time  is  compelled  to 
infer  to  some  thing  from  which  the  sense-matter 
comes,  this  thing,  not  being  given  in  sense,  but  being 
an  inference  of  Eeason  from  the  known  facts,  is  to 
be  called  a  Noumenon. 

Objective  is  a  term  used  in  different  senses  by  dif- 
ferent thinkers.  As  concerns  Kant,  it  is  to  be 
defined  mainly  by  contrast  to  perception  and  con- 
ception. Perception  takes  place  in  relation  to 
sense-elements;  conception  relates  to  the  a  priori 
forms  of  the  mind.  The  conjunction  of  these  two 
gives  knowledge,  which  may  be  said  to  have  an  ob- 
jective reference  in  so  far  as  it  informs  us  of  things 
which  appear  to  us  to  possess  a  definite  character.  It 


94:  TERMS. 

does  not,  with  Kant,  refer  to  ultimate  reality,  which, 
according  to  his  theory  of  Knowledge,  we  can  never 
know  by  aid  of  pure  intellect. 

Paralogism  is  a  term  used  by  Kant  to  indicate  a 
kind  of  fallacious  reasoning  that  is  to  be  contrasted 
with  Sophism.  A  sophism  is  a  false  reasoning  which 
deceives  those  who  hear  it,  but  not  him  who  pro- 
pounds it.  A  Paralogism  is  a  false  reasoning  which 
deceives  him  who  employs  it.  In  other  words,  it  is 
unconscious,  and  may  be  due,  as  the  paralogism  of 
Eational  Psychology  is,  to  a  fundamental  defect  of 
the  human  mind. 

Phenomenon  is  a  term  used  by  Kant  to  indicate 
the  contents  of  experience  when  viewed  in  their  suc- 
cessive occurrence.  If  it  be  true  that  knowledge  con- 
sists of  sense-impressions  "  licked  into  shape  "  by  the 
forms  of  the  mind,  then  we  do  not  know  what  really 
exists  in  an  "  external "  world,  but  only  what  appears 
to  us  under  the  conditions  just  mentioned.  Thus  we 
know  phenomena — what  appears  to  us  to  be,  not 
necessarily  what  actually  is. 

Reason  with  Kant  means  the  faculty  of  knowl- 
edge possessed  by  the  mind.  Pure  Reason  means 
this  faculty  used  without  reference  to  experience,  i.e., 
to  the  matter  derived  from  sense.  It  relates  to  the 
conditions  which  mind  brings  with  it  to  the  con- 
stitution of  experience. 

Wolff,  Christian;  b.  1679,  d.  1754.  His  principal 
systematic  works  notable  in  the  pre-Kantian  de- 
velopment are  written  in  Latin,  and  are  as  follows: 
"  Rational  Philosophy  or  Logic "  (1728)  ;  "  First 
Philosophy  or  Ontology"  (1729);  "General  Cos- 


TERMS.  95 

mology"  (1731);  "Empirical  Psychology"  (1732); 
"Bational  Psychology"  (1734);  "  Natural  The- 
ology" (1736-7).  What  is  of  importance  to  the 
student  of  Kant  is  Wolffs  general  standpoint,  rather 
than  the  details  of  his  system.  See  Caird,  vol.  i., 
chaps,  i-iv. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


RLC  J 


1967 


c  ••; 


RK.C1R.  JIJN5     HO 


LD  21A-60rn-2,'67 
(H241slO)476B 


General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


YA  030 i 6 


